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Abstract 
This thesis determines the viability of “the power realignment” model in explaining 
the increasing tensions among emerging East Asia, Europe and North America. 
Directing at study of power redistribution, this paper proposed a mixed power 
analysis model, “power realignment”, based on emerging power, from a operated 
emerging collective unit, through “co-governance ” and lastly into “possible 
pathways”- a study of dynamic balance. The study involves regional and 
supra-regional government, civil society and multilateral cooperation as subsidiary. 
The integration of East Asia is likely to persist as a result of structural realities in the 
international system. Only if the capability of East Asia begins to converge with its 
international role will the regulative order in this tri-lateral relationship likely cease.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Waves of Change in Contemporary Power System 
Question about the power realignment is to discuss reasons of change for linking 
causes and effect. Waves of change in power system are the basic knowledge to 
analyze the power realignment. 
The history of world politics is usually told as a story of the rise and decline of 
different countries and regions. The motion was evidenced among the Greek 
city-states during the time of Herodotus, who observed that “the cities that were 
formerly great, have most of them become insignificant; and such as are at present 
powerful, were weak in olden time.”1 We can also describe the period between the 
Congress of Westphalia in 1648 and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, 
when Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden fell from the top tier of power, and France, 
Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia emerged as great powers2.  
No such wheel existed during the 19th and 20th century. Since 1945, no new power has 
been able to vault into the great category, though one fell from the ranks. Whether 
structural transformation is dramatic or smooth, the important point is that the 
countries or regions have continually changed in the pecking order. Since the 21st 
century is entering into a complex world order, so some issues become fuzzier: how 
has the international system adjusted to the rising of new power? how has the rising 
power managed peacefully into the existing international order? Moreover, how does 
the rising power reflect a new international order?      
                                                 
1 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.) P.1.  
2 Randall L. Schwelle, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory” in Engaging China: Managing a 
Rising Power, Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds (London and New York: Routledge Press, 1999). 
 1
We can compress two waves change the contemporary power system. First, 
globalization changes the pattern of interaction. In this contemporary age of 
globalization, interdependent relationships have become a general rule outlining the 
changes of system/order and governance structures. The logic of governance under 
globalization affects the governance of states. Globalization brings new concepts, new 
power, and new governance. The change has led states to try to loosen a part of 
sovereign rights in order to accelerate influence by shaping of integration. As 
Wagstaff noted that in examining the relationship between the nation-state and the 
European Union, the view that the nation-state is too small for the big problems and 
too big for the small problems has led to a growing awareness of the power and 
potential influence of regions within the European Union3. The regions have an 
evolving role stemming from these changes. Globalization and regionalization 
become the new international order in which the changes of governance also involve 
with the changes of the actors; state is not only actor in international relations. 
Multilevel, cross-border and cross-regional governance are normal in structure of 
interaction, and competition becomes a pattern of cooperation.  
Secondly, the altering actors in uncertain system. From the above narration, we 
understand some main transformations: interest beyond the nation-state, multicultural 
and multi-polity cooperation. While realist/neorealist assumptions have persisted, 
there has been a steady but gradual movement away from the dominant model of 
black-boxed states. Many students have acknowledged that the conception of national 
interest is inherently subjective and needs to be reinforced. Recent efforts to rescue 
the idea of the unitary state-as-actor at least have begun to differentiate the state from 
                                                 
3 P.Wagstaff, “Introduction: Region, nation, identity” in Regionalism in Europe, (London: Intellect Books, 1994.) 
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society4. While the globe is becoming smaller and interdependent, it is also breaking 
relations between states, beyond state boundaries. Crossing boundaries brings 
transnational exchanges, but also strengthens and actually initiates the region’s 
guiding principles. 
2. Objective and Structure 
2.1 Chapter Outline 
For studying of power redistribution by rising and decline of emerging power in 
international relation this paper will address a model, “power realignment”. The 
process starts from an operated emerging-Complex through mechanism of “power 
realignment” to treat of “possible pathways” (the process of dynamic balance). It 
involves in regional government organizations. The history and reality in integration 
and development of East Asia proves the rationality of model.   
This research is divided into six chapters (Figure 1: Dissertation framework). In the 
introduction, I state the research motivations, purposes, methods, and procedures. In 
addition, I will lay out a brief introduction of fundamentals. We discuss relevant 
articles of changing world system to understand and delineate the system structure; 
and cross-regional governance that are mentioned in international relation theories. 
Chapter 2 surveys theory building of power realignment with special emphasis on the 
conception of dynamic balance. The question that we must consider next is intension 
of changed power structure; we explain the idea by theory of co-governance. Lastly, 
we examine how the model of power realignment in interregional governance 
cooperation could be kept in balance.  
                                                 
4 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, Polities : Authority,Identities, and Change. (Columbia: Univ. of 
South Carolina Press. 1996)pp.17-8. 
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Chapter 3 analyzes the influence and position of the emerging East Asia in the 
dynamic system, the shifting geopolitical role and new order. An emerging regional 
organization accounts for a new geopolitical space, no longer dominated by any 
associated hegemony or monolithic security. The special attractions and influence 
result from its special culture, security, economy, and system, causing a new world 
order. East Asian integration has been breaking international order on issues such as 
emerging political economy, interregional cooperation and power re-distribution.  
Chapter 4 will embark from attraction and influence of East Asian integration, to 
analyze the attempt and policies of EU and North America. In addition, we compare 
ASEM and APEC regarding the pull and drag of power. We address their interaction 
pattern, competition under a cooperational style. Here we clarify the relations between 
East Asia, North America, and the European Union as core-periphery or core-core 
relationships and compare the differences between cross-regional cooperation 
organizations such as APEC and ASEM. In short, the main question addressed in this 
study is if the geographic-historic path of East Asia may condition supra-regional 
cooperation. 
Followed by the analysis of the characteristic of East Asian influence and comparison 
of interregional cooperation in Chapter 3 and chapter 4, we examine path of power 
realignment by analyzing tree blocks’ attempts, within the context of interregional 
governance. The connotations of interaction in the power structure and if is under- or 
counterbalance, are examined. The relationship between regionalization and civil 
society will be a key point in participating in international society. Following this is a 
clarification of the idea of governance in the model of handling international affairs, 
and discussing the general principles of evaluation regarding power analysis in 
international relation theories.  
 4
First, in chapter 5, we analyze the governance of cooperation in both multi-level 
systems; second, we divide the topic into two parts to probe into the power structure 
of interaction: material structure and the structure of ideation (civil society); third, we 
deal with power realignment among two cross-regional organizations (including three 
regions organizations: North America, EU and East Asia) and emphasize policy 
viewpoint to explain the possible pathway of power realignment among actors. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the outcome of the research and offers suggestions regarding 
future trends and following researches. 
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2.2 Methodology 
In order to link the theoretical and practical aspects of this project, it has been 
necessary to employ a combined methodological approach. In this paper, we use 
document analysis that contains a great deal of the collective knowledge on the 
subject. To be able to use documents effectively, the information structure in the 
documents should be carefully planned. International political researches have to 
define document structures and actuality carefully; those consequences will prove 
setting argument. In the analysis, there are overlapping organizations and complex 
competition in East Asia. Current documents and document management practices 
should be studied and described before developing new article structures and article 
management practices5. Typically, one has to deal with different sources of knowledge 
like syntactic knowledge, semantic knowledge or strategic knowledge guiding the 
analytical process6.  
For theoretical building, there is a collection of arguments regarding power analysis 
and regional cooperation from past documentations. The theoretical building that is 
suitable for utilization in this dissertation will be concluded from the collection of 
relevant documentations, the analysis and collation of context, and the result of 
probing into documents. The theoretical building will then become the fundamental 
blueprint by which to analyze the power distribution in cross-regional competition and 
pathway of power realignment.  
 
                                                 
5 Airi Salminen, Katri Kauppinen and Merja Lehtovaara, “Towards a Methodology for Document 
Analysis” .Journal of the American Society for Information Science. Vol. 48, no. 7, (1998.) pp. 644 - 655
6 K. H.Blasius, B Grawemeyer, I. John, N.Kuhn, “Knowledge-based document analysis”. This paper appears in: 
Document Analysis and Recognition, 1997, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference (Germany,Ulm, 
18-20 Aug,1997.) 
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There are three stages to analyze this paper. The first of is the assessment of the 
theoretical literatures on power theory. This serves as a basis for judging the utility of 
this particular model and understanding the increasing tensions in the triangle 
relationship (East Asia, Europe, and North American). The second stage is the 
analysis of past and present positions in the East Asia, in addition to emerging streams 
of thoughts. The third stage is the study of policy statements and regional strategic 
policy.  
2.3 Limiting Scope of Topic 
In an international system, cognition means an actor’s degree of psychological 
functions which explains why and how does the system changes and how to keep the 
balance. Action refers to the inner interaction within an international structure namely 
external reaction. 
In this 21st, international organizations play a greater role than they ever had in 
history7. The actors in international relation always mention that regional government, 
civil social organization and nation-states are typical representative of power 
redistribution. On the basis of the limitation, this paper discusses the cooperation and 
competition among regional organizations, and civil society and nation-states are 
subsidiary, without much discussion on NGOs and transnational corporations.  
This paper focuses on the cooperation and competition among IGOs and asks the 
question of how does the rudiment of East Asia community (causing by rising 
integration in East Asia has building) change the interaction of supra-regional 
organizations. We can probe into the process of power transformation through 
                                                 
7 Paul. F. Diehl, The Politics of Global Governance: International in an Interdependent World. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996) pp.3. 
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supra-regional organizations, which displays the trend of power change and also apply 
historical recall to explore possible development pathways. This paper, it only confers 
the supra-regional organizations after rudiment of East Asia community.    
3. Theories of Change System  
In this section, we would like to arrange the theories of changing system. It starts from 
dynamic space to describe different theoretical perceptive, following probe into 
variant dimension of uncertain system.    
3.1 Feature of World System  
3.1.1 Dynamics Space- Regions and new geopolitical relation 
There is an obvious continuity in the exploration of the new geopolitical relations in a 
number of ways. According to the “period”, John Agnew simplifies geopolitics in 
three ages8. One is in the late eighteenth century civilization geopolitics, another is 
naturalized geopolitics, and third is ideological geopolitics. A ‘periodization’ of 
geopolitical discourse simplifies a more complex flow of representations and practices; 
the issue addresses dominate trends, comprehension, actors and the difference over 
time.  
The civilization geopolitics of the early nineteenth century gave way to the 
naturalized geopolitics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After the 
Second World War, an ideological geopolitics was constituted on the basis of the new 
geopolitical “realities” of the time. After ideological geopolitics, conceptions of 
relative decline, state-centered competition and hegemony laid up a global basis, and 
                                                 
8 John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, (Routledge: London and New York, 2003.). P. 86-121. 
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economic globalization, provide the opportunity for most forms of political activity. 
However, how could we explain the new geopolitical relations in culture or ideology? 
The problem involved is twofold. First, what are the driving forces and actors behind 
the phenomenon of globalization? It is result of power relationships; the driving 
forces may be resource needs, political predominance or military superiority. 
Furthermore, in the globalization age, the actors become multiple. The “relativization 
of scale” is attested to by the emergence of global city networks, cross-board, regional 
block formations, international NGOs and other forms of boundary-transcending 
exchanges9. Similarly, a new geopolitical space could emerge under global order in 
the sense that it is no longer dominated by any single hegemony or super state or by 
monopolized security.   
Second, what roles do actors play in shaping the world order? In the general system, 
the role of actors indicates influential ability. Nevertheless, in uncertain system, the 
role of actors indicates the gap with power that comprehends and account how the 
structure was getting transition, how security and interests change in relative 
comparative power and how actors deal with the capability is equal to the foreign 
policy role. As Doran observed, bargaining occurs between state and system in terms 
of the power a state attains (in rough analogy to “supply”) and the role that the system 
is willing to ascribe to the state (“demand”), where the “price” is the probability of 
war 10 . Actors’ power and its role constitute the underlying dynamic of how 
international political roles cause changes to the new world order. To know the change 
of role is to know possible ways for power adjustment, because a change in relative 
                                                 
9 Bob Jessop, “The Political Economy of Scale”, In Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-border Regions: 
Scales, Discourses and Governance, Perkmann and Sum eds, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
10 Doran Charles, “Economics, Philosophy of History, and the "Single Dynamic" of Power Cycle Theory: 
Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft.” International Political Science Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003. pp. 
13-49. 
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capability determines the future possibilities of each nation, as seen against the 
background of what is demanded in international politics11.  
In summation, each period has its particular combination of elements. Notably, the 
new geopolitical relation is close to “the geographic dimension”. Differing from the 
past three ages, the new reveals regional blocks as actors in cooperation and 
competition. Regional blocks have “dimension” in a physical space conception to 
define the space of interaction by their relevant dimensions, and use the space as a 
framework. Global complex interdependence challenges blocks’ flexibility of 
response and breaks the traditional political limit. During this period, it is not only 
simple market requirement or political power, but also includes a conception of 
complex security, which wrestles over the ration of cost and interest. Each block is 
like an agency, a collective unit and competitor in that space. Under the global order, 
regional blocks’ power is connected from up to down (from global level to state level, 
even to individual level) and horizontally. As it unfolds, it shows that it needs a more 
coordinated and collaborative ability because of the complex governance and 
interdependence. The increasing flow of information, technology, people, goods and 
notions around the world create uncertain phenomena. Compared with the past actors, 
the new actors face a more treacherous world.   
3.1.1.1 New Geopolitical Relation within Globalization 
As argued above, the new geopolitical relation unfolds a phenomenon related to 
geographical features. Close geographical relations strengthen cooperation of regional 
countries. One compelling question that emerges from these observations is which 
                                                 
11 Franz Kohout  “Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative 
Reflections on War Causation.” International Political Science Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003. pp.51-66. 
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relationship to interlock among the factors of new geopolitical relations, regionalism 
and globalization. In short, globalization brings a different circumstance that extends 
regionalization to change its form to respond to unmanaged and uncertain 
transformations. A serial activity of regionalization reveals the new geopolitical 
relationship. After the Cold War, the political condition shaped the concept of 
globalization in international society, because economic development, political 
interaction and technological advancement reduced transactions costs during the Cold 
War. Globalization, however, has brought success and wealth, transforming the 
international economy from state-oriented to market-oriented, indicating that 
sovereignty was experiencing a corrosive crisis. Globalization’s program can be 
defined as the vision of a borderless world.  
The changing structure of the world system provides room for regional actors’ 
maneuvering. The regions can be defined as groups of countries that build 
associations around a set of common interests12, and regionalism seems to be the only 
activity by which to confront Globalization. Although the region is slowly becoming 
an actor on its own terms, the nation states typically still conceive of it as an arena 
where so-called “national interests” could be promoted, and these interests are, of 
course, differently conceived by different social groups in society. Whereas certain 
groups may find it rewarding to move into the supranational space, others cling to the 
national space where they have vested interests to protect. Regionalization thus 
creates its own counter-forces13.  
At the same time, regional actors in the process of regionalization constitute a 
                                                 
12 James Wesley Scott. “The Northern Dimension” In Cross-border Governance in the European Union. Kramsch, 
Olivier Thomas and Hooper, Barbara eds.,. (London; New York: Routledge 2004) pp.135-157 
13 Björn Hettne. Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. In Globalism and Regionalism Toshiro 
Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi.. Hayama,eds. (Japan:United Nations University,1996), p 10. 
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structural change towards multi-polarity. The development of these regional 
associations has prompted much discussion over shifting scales of governance and the 
changing role of nation-states in the world-system14. It affects and is affected by many 
levels of the world system: the system as a whole, the level of interregional relations, 
and the internal structure of the single region. It is not possible to state which of these 
levels comes first or which is the more important since changes on the various levels 
interact. There are also different dimensions of the process that relate to each other. 
Facing the complex structures of regionalization and globalization, actors will try to 
seek a new balance situation. Emerging power must be concerned about the 
hegemonic regional dangers to avoid vassal status while seeking an advantage by 
following the process. Existing power will regard itself as a regulator for the 
management of disequilibrium and will be concerned about the share of the costs to 
supply a collective good. In the absence of strong institutions, the stability and 
manageability of international society constitutes the cardinal aspiration of the 
power-holder, with reference to relative power decline and power share. The 
subjective sense of geographical distance is dramatically changed; some even speak of 
“the end of geography”15. New geopolitical relations, however, elucidate the conflict 
between the logic of globalization and regionalization which attempts to cushion the 
effect. For distinct geographical features, derived from specialty customs and 
convention, there are separate regional and foreign maneuvers in each block. The 
interregional cooperation is one way to attenuate the cost of translating systemic 
structure.     
                                                 
14 Perkmann, M. and Sum, N, Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-border Regions: Scales, Discourses and 
Governance. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
15 Björn Hettne. Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia. In Globalism and Regionalism Toshiro 
Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, Hayama, eds. (Japan: United Nations University,1996), p 4-5. 
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3.1.1.2 Actors’ Opportunity 
In the age of speedy information and technology flow, “the nation-state is too small 
for the big problems” has led to a growing awareness of power and potential influence 
of regions. Regions need more than hinterland but rather faithful partners, neighboring 
and developing countries; for creating high-speed connections the network is the best 
choice; therefore, cross-boundary cooperation has become very important. Regions 
provide a new place for the construction of politics and political symbolism in the 
global order. The state itself is being transformed and in the process is losing its 
former ability to manage spatial changes and developments. Its power and authority 
have been eroded from three directions: from above, by internationalization; from 
below by regional and local assertions; and laterally, by the advances of market and 
civil society16. The state has lost the monopoly power and parts of its ability to control 
the common interests. Regions are like agencies in terms of political symbolism 
cooperation and competition with other regions or supranational organizations. 
Regionalization refers to regional processes that lead to different patterns of 
cooperation within a specific geographical area, and also refers to a body of ideas, 
values and objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying different 
goals within a particular region 17 . However, a very substantial conception of 
state-specificity exists concerning aspects of culture, history, economics, politics, and 
geography and so on in the regions. The collapse of the Cold War order has led to 
many different issues related to the creation of a new order and the position of regions 
such as Europe or Asia-pacific within the new order. Even though the EU has high 
                                                 
16 M. Keating. The New Tegionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change. (Edward 
Elgar,1998) P.72-73 
17 Petri Virtanen, “Euregions in Changing Europe: Euregion Karelia and Euroregion Pomerania as Examples ” In 
Cross-Border Governance in the European Union, OT Kramsch, B Hooper, Eds.(Routledge, 2004). pp.121-134. 
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degree of integration diversity clearly still exists; Asia-pacific, from social, political 
and economic perspectives, is highly diverse.  
Appreciably, integration always begins from an economic spillover to other levels. As 
Philip Cerny stated, whatever the specifics of globalization may be, one of its most 
important qualities in terms of public policy is its service as a powerful discourse that 
shapes domestic and international debates, a process which may change the state’s 
role to one of an “enforcer of decisions and/or outcomes which emerge from world 
markets.”18 Globalization redounds to new actor’s turning point but new challenge. 
Globalization re-identifies the territoriality, monopolistic control of the means of 
violence, an impersonal structure of power that provide actors get new role through 
numerous global processes. However, indistinct world order reveal desire to claim to 
legitimacy 19 . Economic, political, and social groups unfold unprecedented 
close-combinations, which relate to the development of technology and connection in 
which actors and makers earn a profit from easy cross-nation operation, while 
increasing uncertainty and risk, e.g., countries lose control of their economic or 
political operation because when policy-choice as a key policy tool cannot be used, it 
must be solved through integration to relax in highly transformation.   
Transitional structure brings new challenges and gives peripheral actors a new 
opportunity to advance by existent advantages. In addition, to control the internal part 
and international affairs creates a situation where the same region can belong to more 
than one group of people. There are many different groups of “us” and “them” within 
the same region.  
                                                 
18 Philip Cerny, “Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization”. Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 32 No.2, 1997. pp. 258, 251–74. 
19 D Held, A McGrew, D Goldblatt, J Perraton. “Global Transformations: Political, Economics and Culture”. 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2003) pp. 45-49 
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3.1.2 Power beyond State－New Geopolitical Relations and Global Governance  
In this paper, we deal with the structure of governance under space dynamics in two 
parts, empirical administration and social ideology. Notwithstanding some scholars 
considering that after the Second World War, it was not only the ending of the 
European-power period in the world, but also the ending of geopolitics. In 1994, 
Kissinger indicated that the new world order would be shared by six major powers20 
demonstrating that the leadership and rules were changing. In the new world order, we 
are one part of an interdependent system. In the new geopolitical relationships, 
developments of inter-region interactions exemplify a transition to greater 
multi-polarity in the world system, characterized by more cooperation agendas, 
multi-actor policy arenas and development of a transnational civil society. After the 
Cold War, geopolitics was back, in a new way Vis-à-Vis the global order.  
3.1.2.1 Changing Concepts in International System 
A fluctuating international system has changed actors’ cognizance of societal order 
and the past thinking of hierarchical politics. New interaction relations have also 
changed actors’ cognizance of power, where and how to build a new role, how to 
reinforce strength and how to communicate with others, all interaction-level, with the 
process of negotiation much different from that of the past. Following, we will discuss 
some changing concepts: War, Risk and syncretic dilemmas. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The six major powers: USA, EU, China, Japan, Russia and India. Henry Kissinger (1994) Diplomacy. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
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z War 
War is a key element of power shift, but not essential. New international actors and 
the new order have changed the ideal of massive destruction, creating a new layout. 
War in past periods constituted a critical point to change the power distribution. War 
accounted for a horrid cost more than interests served. However, war’s position in 
international politics remains a controversial issue. “Whether international society 
changes according to the scale of war”, some scholars cite major war as the critical 
point of the causal impact. In long cycle theory, each cycle is born in major warfare; 
the military power is able to support its economic goals, especially benefiting from 
world trade that it more or less monopolized21. 
Gilpin, a hegemonic theory scholar, developed a concept of hegemonic stability. The 
most important insight in hegemonic theory is that war and change were initiated in 
order to expand the rising or dominant state’s influence to the limits of its new 
capability22. War, in terms of systemic stability, is an unavoidable process for states to 
maintain their relative power. Nevertheless, in the past cold war, such realism had 
been challenged by the balance of power, and contemporary versions of the conflict 
do not focus only on military and aircraft but also on “soft” power, especially in 
economic interests.  
War is seen as a selection process for finding a new leading power. In particular, after 
serious destruction, actors have learned the cost of re-establishment; in facing the 
adjustment of power, it is important to control conflict degree.  
 
                                                 
21 G. Modelski and W.R. Thompson. Seapower and Global Politics, 1494-1993. (London: Macmillan, 1988.) 
22 R. Gilpin. War And Change in World Politics. (Cambridge University Press,1981) 
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z Risk 
Because of the changes in the new way of thinking of war, aspirations of economic 
development and maintenance of order stability, actors must use multifarious 
strategies to fuse multilateral diversity in order to avoid war or serious conflict. They 
will look at every event at the worst and calculate any incidence of risk. New 
geographic-basis interaction applies that we regard the region as united, when we 
relax the assumption that states are the only actors; “supra-regional” applies. With a 
region as a unity, there is more difficulty in estimating complex interdependence.  
Power must involve a series of competing activities. Interdependence causes 
international cooperation, wherein we cannot be sure concerning the possibility of 
beguilement leaving cooperative relations unstable on both sides. The new 
international system has created a new structure of competition and cooperation. New 
networks create a new complex relationship as well. It is seen as an extreme 
conception of competition, when a common consensus exists in a new network. It is 
not a balance of horror as in the Cold War; the new relations give actors in conflict the 
possibility of integration and cooperation. 
An actor in the international society who gets into a dilemma when cooperating and 
competing with other actors must undergo circumstantial decision-making and 
risk-disposition. In the early 20th century, the international society required more 
streamlined international integration and cooperation. Accompanying the new 
challenges of globalization led the policy-makers to try to find a new pattern or 
pathway for administration. The global whirlpool swept away all members (it is not 
only state, but also international organizations, NGOs and regional blocks etc…). All 
actors are politicians, barnstormers, and arguers in the same time. Regional governors 
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have stepped into the international game inchmeal and played important roles, giving 
rise to conflicts. In this game, an actor’s behavior involves a series of decision-making 
processes. When considering decision-making from a normative perspective, it is 
important to remember that the outcome of a decision is not simply made at the 
moment individuals decide to do one thing rather than another, but is determined by a 
whole series of factors. 
The risks involved the exploitation of their prime resources; the replacement of local 
energy resources and the potential destruction of regional governance, not to mention 
that increasing dependence upon foreign influence was often understated for the sake 
of short-term economic gains that could bolster the power position of regional block 
in the sharing gain of the international system. The ability of risk management for the 
multilateral/bilateral interaction is high relative to the country/region if competition is 
low, if information is opaque, and if the importance of transactions is high cost. On 
the other hand, countries/regions can be expected to have high bargaining power if 
competition is high, if information is anticipatable, and if transaction costs are low.  
z Syncretic Dilemmas 
In the bipolar age, hegemonic control led to the toleration of different cultures and 
religions in the same region by obeying superpower. In globalization, regional 
integration combined in a respect-way. Complex interactions demonstrate high degree 
of sensitivity and vulnerability. Administration of blurring policy in interdependence23 
displays a compelling question about fusion of different culture and moral. The world 
map is filled with different culture blocks, which leads to conflicts between diverse 
                                                 
23  Joseph S. Nye. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. (London; New 
York : Routledge,2004).pp.155-158. 
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cultures. However, regional integration attempts to be a fusion of these differences. 
The fusion of different cultures changes the other actors’ thought and challenges the 
existing interaction relationships, for example, western individualism and eastern 
community. Mary Douglas argued that culture involves risk perception; a culture bias 
is a point of view with its own framing assumptions and readily available solutions for 
standardized problems24. Supra-region communications will affect different people in 
a common arena and will create different patterns of moral consciousness. The 
globalization of nations diminishes ideology and traditional value systems to provide 
social cohesion. Therefore, Douglas also argues that modern societies support a 
combination of cultures, with the major power axis extending from the high group, 
high grid or hierarchical quadrant to the low group, low grid or individualistic 
quadrant25. It explains that major power’s culture will extend to rising power (group) 
but does not cover its culture. Culturally distinct regions have in recent years been 
attempting to develop a model of regional economic development where their cultural 
distinctiveness is regarded as a competitive advantage over their competitor26. In other 
words, major powers must embrace emerging diversity to meet the challenges.  
With supra-regional activity increasing, actors become more sensitive to one another, 
which may lead the elite to increase their efforts to control non-governmental 
behavior. Face-to-face communications often transmit more information, which can 
affect policy exceptions and preferences. The new order issues lead negotiating 
institutions overlapping, and issue spillovers make it hard to enforce. When problems 
happen, the policy of central executives is often unclear on detail; policy-estimation 
                                                 
24Mary Douglas. (1999)The Depoliticisation of Risk. In Implicit Meanings : Selected Essays in Anthropology. M. 
Douglas (Ed.) pp 225. 218-230. 
25 H.Susan MacDonald.“Globalization and Risk: a Contingent Responser for Democratic Governance.” 
Administrative Theory and Praxis. Vol.24(1),2002 P.43. 31-54. 
26 Michael Keating and John Loughlin. “Introduction”. In The Political Economy of Regionalism. Michael Keating 
and John Loughlin. Eds. 1996. p.3. 1-13. 
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must take notice of different things at different level, and even different organization. 
The blurring policy means a buffer time to seek next step. “One man’s policy is 
another man’s tactics.”27  
3.2 Divergent Approaches to Power System Analysis 
It is important and notable that power structure changes from bipolar to multi-polar, 
when the international society shifts into the post Cold-War era. Here will probes into 
power transformation theory and power balance theory, and forms system level to 
apprehend that divergent approaches to power system.  
Realist emphasizes that nation-states lead balance of international order. Power 
magnitude determines a state’s action in the international organization which 
operation and establishment only reflect freehearted international politics and power 
structure28. Structure of power redistribution in international society decides the order 
and steady in the international system. Hegemony depends on interest and preference 
to construct international order under which the feature of regional organizations is 
that states seeking to increase individual power, instead of forge a new alliance 
resisting hegemony and keeping balance. Christopher Layne held that unipolar derives 
from hegemony. Any state increasing its power would need to find a way to balance 
the existing power, even challenge, aiming to achieve the predominant position under 
the assumption that power structure in system will change to bi- or multi- 
competition.  
Liberalism emphasizes that institute, competition and cooperation coexist in a regime. 
Neoliberalism suggests that regimes and rules in an international organization can 
                                                 
27 Raymond Bauer. The Study of Policy Formation, (New York, 1968).p.2.  
28 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism” International Organization, vol. 42,No. 3, 1989, pp. 485-507 
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change the action and interest of states29. States are influenced mainly by basic 
institutes and rules, instead of the operation of international power structure. Benefit 
trade-off model indicates that whether regional cooperation is successful depends on  
whether the leader state(s) is willing to accept responsibility. In present studies, 
potential benefits are restricted by factor endowments, as well as the limit of 
economies of scale or uncertain long-term formulation30. Many attempts of regional 
cooperation have failed due to restraint of potential benefit. External element offers 
benefit trade-off at an absolute critical point. Dependence of finance and security and 
satisfaction of external beneficiary, all influence the ways and possibility of 
cooperation. International power from regional hegemony to balance mechanism ally 
with external states and restrain external hegemony.          
Constructivism claims that ideal is more important than matter, regardless of the 
power distribution or the magnitude of a states, and power operation determines on 
ideal and through. Society establishes community as one of its conceptions. “Safe 
community” proposed by Karl Detusch31 claims that the logic of community has 
displaced the logic of anarchy, and it clearly explains the change way of power 
worming for nation-states in framework of globalization that coordinate with the 
transformation of regionalism turn into a intermediate zone facing globalization. This 
external power drives order in hegemonic region, and the process of benefit trade-off 
fills with power abridgement and asymmetric. An unbalance system is bound to be 
challenged from the region seek regional impendence, widespread cooperation and 
                                                 
29 Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism, David A. Baldwin eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.) 
30 Walter Mattli, The Logicogregional Integration:Europe and beyond, (Cambridge university press,2001),p60. Hal 
Hill, “Challenge in ASEAN Economic Cooperation: and Outside’s Perspective” in ASEAN at Crossroads, Institute 
of Strategic and International Studies, Noordin Sopiee, Chew Lay See and Lim Siang Jin, eds., (Kuala Lumpur, 
1987,) pp. 81-89. 
31 Karl Deutsch., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area─International Organization in the Light of 
Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).   
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power equality. A.F.K Organski’s advanced Power-transition theory suggests that 
conflict and war occur when emerging power access or exceed existing power since 
emerging power has confidence to challenge, and existing power anticipate avoiding 
other emerging power. Contrary to the traditional “Balance of power theory”, with its 
power parity hypothesis, which claims that an equality in power is conductive to 
peace, “Power transition theory” reach the opposite conclusion claiming the 
probability of war between the rising challenger and the dominant state that peaks 
near the point of power transition between them32. 
3.2.1 Problems-  
From above theories, some ideas are proposed herein to modify power theories::    
1. Study of the linkage between emerging actors and safe is not compact enough, 
thus resulting that the statement of “motivation” is not insightful. 
2. In different phases of power distribution, it is lack of systemic analysis on actors’ 
connections.   
3. Predominate states and hegemony has been emphasized excessively, while 
neglecting the importance of civil society and spillover from market interest. 
4. Adopting non-historical approach namely applies certain models in similar 
structure in all time and ways, while neglecting diverseness of interaction in 
specific historic background.   
To overcome those insufficiencies, Chapter 2 proposes an analysis framework of 
“power realignment” analyzes the process of power realignment in East Asia 
integration and interacting with North American and Europe.   
                                                 
32 Organski, A.F.K .World Politics, 3. Auflage, New York, 1969 (Erstausgabe 1958) 
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3.3 Identify-The Feature of New Governance  
3.3.1 Multi-Polarity  
Historical examples of hegemonic stability with a stable international order based on 
the leadership of a dominate hegemony are no longer adequate for representing 
international relations in the 1990s and beyond33. America is becoming a superpower 
when Soviet Union collapsed, greatly influenced world economy, politics and military. 
However, unipolarity means that the U.S. must spend a lot to maintain the order in its 
design and to build mechanisms for increasing their interests. The cost of public 
goods and transformations result in new actors entering the world system in other 
patterns.  
New international order brings many new opportunities, but changes the model of 
leadership position of states in the international arena. Inter-regional cooperation is 
one of the new models. According to the geographical region, regional hegemonic 
attraction increases regional coherence. Regional organizations build associations 
around a set common interest. The development of regional associates has promoted 
much discussion over shifting scales of governance and the change role of 
nation-states in the world-system. The role of states progresses from regional state to 
regional governance. Transformation of the world system offers emerging actors the 
opportunity to join in international affairs and play a key role. The EU has 
experienced new thinking and engaged in activities in other regions including building 
institutions; further, the U.S. has been increasing relative power, resulting in 
invigorated collective power. 
                                                 
33 Paul Parker, Japan and the Global Environment: Leadership in Environment Technology. In Global Geopolitical 
Change and the Asia Pacific Region. pp. 94.  
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Whether hierarchical erosion occurs through interdependence? In globalization, the 
key phenomena regarding major economic changes as noted above, have been the 
transformations of authority relations and political practices within and across 
national jurisdictions34. Generally, we identify that an international society has no 
central government and lacks absolute power, which cause contention (or war) 
according to changing situations. In the international social order, however, anarchy 
exists, governance without government. Unclear leader has yet emerged to set a new 
path for the international order. Seeking a powerful ally in the center of an 
interest-sharing system is a way for strengthening power. Coalition-building weakens 
government but enhances common aspirations.  
Power has always been an elusive concept in international affairs; it has become 
increasingly slippery in interdependence and hierarchy is not absolute to have 
possession of power. As Nye argued, there are three conditions for the use of force in 
interdependence: (1) risks of nuclear escalation; (2) uncertain and possible negative 
effects on the achievement of economic goals; and (3) domestic opinion opposed to 
the human costs of the use of force35. This all explain the change in uncertain system 
has broke “Hegemonic Stability” increasing the possibility of multi-leader in 
contemporary age.  
3.3.2 Multilateralism, Multi-level 
The rationale behind development multi-polarity conceptualization of world order is 
to be found in the specific regional problems characterizing each region. This is true 
not only because hegemonic power has declined, but because much of the agenda is 
                                                 
34 Mark Beeson. “Globalization, Governance, and the Political-Economy of Public Policy Reform,” in East Asia. 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol.14, No. 4. 2001. pp. 485,  
35 Nye. pp. 159-160. 
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concerned with organizing collective action 36 . Cultural and socio-economic 
heterogeneity exist in different regions; a specific danger was identified in the close 
linkages among population, resource, technology and the environment. The 
enlargement (like the EU) and integration (like East Asia) have strengthened a 
co-operating sense of economic, social and environment interdependence. In other 
words, the geographic dimension in the new regionalism increases cooperation but 
contains competition in the work countering fears of possible instability from world’s 
political and economic problems. While these conceptual concerns are articulated by 
national governments, local and regional actors are linked by the vast issues at stake.          
Relationships between formal administrative governance structures of state and more 
informal collaborative mechanisms of policy-formulation make for a high level of 
contingency within different regional contexts37. Development perspectives for these 
often far-flung communities will depend on effective networking and thus on the 
improvement of physical communications and interstate political relationships38. As 
the geopolitical situation changes, an early response is new regime building and 
taking advantage of new opportunities for political dialogue. It encourages 
multilateral cooperation, focusing on economic and environmental issues.  
From the regional geopolitical perceptive, the creation of supra-regional agendas 
began well before the international system could become stable. With the appreciation 
of distinct features within different regions, the process of trust-building partnerships 
becomes more possible, as many strategic issues emerge. The role of region as actor is 
not only about military power or so-called high level political hegemony, but also 
                                                 
36 Nye. 160 
37 James W. Scott. “The Northern Dimension.” in Cross-border governance in the European Union.. Olivier 
Thomas Kramsch, Barbara Hooper eds. (London : Rutledge, 2004) pp. 139.   
38 Ibid. pp.142 
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other issues (such as public goods’ protection). Supra-regionalism operates both in 
theory and in practice on the basis of multilateral agendas and multilevel 
trans-boundary cooperation among different actors and regions. For Castelles, 
globalization is stratifying, diversifying, exclusionary, and-to that extend-exploitative, 
inherently unstable, with potential for the reordering of shifting relationships of 
power39. Supra-region as platform was established to focus the various goals and 
operating framework. Among supra-regional cooperation actors, from purely state 
agencies to a variety of organizations, financial institutions and the private sector are 
seen to be important actors for achieving the success of stabilizing the world system. 
In terms of agenda-setting, the national and regional policy-making elites try to 
maintain a commanding role. Protection against threats will remain a major foreign 
policy problem in operating under one global organization, like the WTO. In the 
absence of effective third-party enforcement, agreements must be self-enforcing; that 
is, agreements may still be based on self-help, but cooperation requires a stronger 
governance structure. Self-enforcement requires issue linkage so that benefits of 
cooperation to each party offset the costs, thereby deterring opportunism40. To avoid 
any unfair distribution of benefits-cost many new agenda items will pursuit of legality. 
3.3. 3 Civil Society 
Supra-regional interaction problem in the construction of structures involves the 
changing contours of the territory. National and local governments are quite unable by 
themselves to effectively regulate phenomena like global mass media, global 
ecological problems, and global finance. Trans-border flows can not be tied to a 
                                                 
39 Manuel Castells. The Rise of Network Society. (Cambridge, ma:Blackwell publisher,1996). pp.95-99. 
40 Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough. “Regionalism and Layered Governance: The Choice of Trade 
Institutions.” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 48, 1994. pp. 170-193. 
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strictly delimited territorial space over which a state might endeavor to exercise 
unilateral full control,41 given that many people’s loyalty supplements and in some 
cases even overrides state-centered nationalism. In addition, many people in the 
contemporary globalizing world have become increasingly ready to acknowledge 
‘supra-territorial values’. This changing contour of the demos reveals that civil society 
might contribute to global governance.  
These structural problems are evident in democratic deficits that have been still 
further diluted in intergovernmental governance mechanisms. Given the democratic 
deficits outlined above and the inadequacy of state mechanisms to resolve them, it is 
understandable that increasing numbers of citizens have considered civil society as a 
way to enhance public participation, consultation, transparency and accountability in 
global governance. Civil society might enhance democracy in global governance 
through public education activities and might make positive contributions to 
democratic global governance by giving voice to stakeholders42. 
Yet it also means that civil society is a kind of power that can influence international 
relations. Telò instanced Europe as an incipient, collective civilian power moving 
towards a multi-polar world. The EU contributes to global governance by collectively 
encouraging states in other continents to deepen regional cooperation. The EU has 
developed a new dimension in international relations43. We can compare civilian 
power with Joseph Nye’s “soft power”. Civilian power has defended and championed 
the institutional strengthening of those international organizations, while promoting 
the continuation of new global regimes. It is a kind of power to influence international 
                                                 
41 Jan Aart Scholte. “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance.” Centre for the Study of Globalisation 
and Regionalisation (CSGR) Working Paper No. 65/01. University of Warwick, Coventry. pp10. 
42 Ibid.pp.16-17 
43 Telò, Mario. Europe: A Civilian Power? : European Union, Global Governance, World Order. Houndmills [u.a.]: 
(Palgrave Macmillan. 2006) pp. 50-55. 
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relations. It is a useful instrument for affecting others and changing decision-making 
before enforcement.    
4. Regions and Supra-Regions 
Regions in this paper indicate that political geography regions in international politics, 
which tend to be based on political units such as multinational groupings, including 
formally defined units such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, and NATO. Supra-regions in this paper indicate organizations 
cooperate from cross political geography regions such as APEC and ASEM.   
4.1 Regions: 
4.1.1 ASEAN, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit  
United States has been viewed as a single hegemony after the Cold War in the world 
system, but could has to face the ascendancy of China in economics and politics, 
ASEAN independence in East Asia region, and EU positive diplomacy in Europe. 
Under the development of power interaction, East Asia is viewed as a forming actor 
because of ASEAN+3 and East Asia summit are considered as an effective instrument, 
and East Asian countries have a consensus to build a community. ASEAN+3 is the 
axis of the integration of East Asia, albeit it is confronted with difficulties. ASEAN 
plays a key position in East Asia integration, and is the Presidency of East Asia 
summit, so that we will discuss the history and foreign policy of ASEAN, as well as 
the form and operation of ASEAN+3 and East Asia summit.   
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4.1.1.1 ASEAN 
Historical Overview and ASEAN Foreign Relations 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on August 8, 
1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on January 8, 1984, 
Vietnam on July 28, 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on July 23, 1997, and Cambodia 
on  April 30, 1999.44 ASEAN stated that “Bangkok Declaration” for advancing 
regional economics grows by equal spirit and cooperation. ASEAN had three features 
in its infancy: 1.) blurry goals and lack of operating mechanism; 2.) highlight the form 
of cooperation but not achievements; 3.) more successful political cooperation than 
economic ones. ASEAN was established in 60’s Cold War era to united new 
independent countries to confront communism and seek stability. After the Cold War, 
the bipolar power in Southeast Asia collapsed, and political structure changed, while 
the economic remained the same. The change was due to the power adjust of the 
Unite States, emerging China, economic crisis, and anti-terrorism, but the most 
important thing was that the power structure change in East Asia to build common 
view. ASEAN has transformed to as unit of economic priority to maintain 
competitiveness ability between Asian power countries. On November 20, 2007, on 
the 40th anniversary of ASEAN, the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN Member 
Countries gathered in Singapore for the 13th ASEAN Summit and signed an “ASEAN 
Charter” for building an “ASEAN Economic Community” on 2015. ASEAN has 
become an entity on law; it means ASEAN increases self-ability.  
                                                 
44 Association Of Southeast Asian Nations - Overview http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm 
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4.1.1.2 ASEAN+3 Summit45 and East Asia Summit46  
Historical Overview 
The idea of creating a forum of East Asian countries was first introduced and 
promoted by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, at the occasion of a 
state visit to the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in December 1991. The East Asian 
Economic Grouping (EAEG) envisioned by Mahathir was to form the basis of an East 
Asian economic bloc as an answer to the uncertain outcome of the Uruguay round of 
the GATT and plans of economic bloc-building in North America and Western 
Europe (NAFTA and the European Community). At the same time, just one year after 
the Tianmen massacre, the proposal was a political signal to the world that Malaysia 
intended to act as a bridge in ASEAN for a constructive relationship with China. 
The Fifth Summit was held in Bangkok, Thailand in December 1995. To strengthen 
regional development and cooperation, the ASEAN Leaders contributed to Japan as 
center. In addition, EAEG advanced by Malaysia transformed from East Asia 
Economic Caucus (EAEC). Although economic crisis was severe, ASEAN was 
resumed and increased its influence by economic liberalization and political 
integration. The role of ASEAN in East Asia is critical to China and Japanese 
leadership.   
The Thirtieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in Subang Jaya, Malaysia on July 
24–25, 1997. In this meeting, they looked forward to the convening of Summit 
meetings between the Heads of State/ Government of ASEAN and the Heads of 
State/Government of the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
                                                 
45ASEAN + 3 Countries: ASEAN, Japan, China, Republic of Korea. 
46 East Asia Summit: ASEAN + 3 Countries, New Zealand, Australia and India. Russia has applied for 
membership and as of 2005, attends on observer status. 
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on the occasion of the Commemorative Summit. Because this summit was held after 
the “ASEAN+3 Summit” in Kuala Lumpur, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) was 
initiated by Korean President Kim Dae-jung at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Hanoi in 
1998 to discuss long-term cooperation in the region.  
In 1999, the ASEAN Summits were broadened to include not only heads of 
government of “the 10+3”, but also their foreign, finance, and trade ministers as well. 
This came in addition to the meetings of these groups held at other points during the 
year. An unprecedented joint declaration, “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation”, 
on the future of East Asia by ASEAN, Japan, Korea, and China pledged cooperation 
on economic and social development, politics, and security47. 
In the November 2000 Summit, ASEAN Leaders agreed to launch the Initiative for 
ASEAN Integration (IAI). The IAI is intended to provide a framework for regional 
cooperation through which the more developed ASEAN members could help less 
developed members. It would focus on education, skills development and worker 
training. The Leaders of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea emphasized the 
importance of closer cooperation among East Asian countries. They supported the 
proposal by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung for an East Asia Study Group 
(EASG) (which was established in March 2001). The purpose of the study group is to 
assess the recommendations of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and explore the 
idea and implications of an East Asia summit. The 14-member study group is 
consisted of 13 senior officials from the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan and 
Korea along with the Secretary-General of ASEAN. A Working Group of the East 
Asia Study Group has been set up to assist the senior officials.  
                                                 
47Association Of Southeast Asian Nations- http://www.us-asean.org/ASEANOverview/asean+3.asp. 
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The 2002 report of the East Asian Study Group, established by the ASEAN Plus 3 
countries, was based on an EAS involving ASEAN+3, not involving Australia, New 
Zealand or India. The Japanese and the 10 ASEAN Leaders attended the two-day 
ASEAN-Japan Summit on December 12, 2003. The Summit marked Japan's three 
decades of ties with ASEAN and was the first meeting of 10 ASEAN Leaders held in 
a non-member country. At the end of the summit, the leaders signed the Tokyo 
Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New 
Millennium, and pledged the creation of an East Asian community to enhance 
cooperation. ASEAN would also work with its other dialogue partners -- China and 
South Korea -- to develop the East Asian community. 
The ASEAN+3 Summit was held successfully on November 29, 2004 in Vientiane. 
The Leaders of the +3 countries supported ASEAN Leaders’ decision to convene the 
first East Asia Summit (EAS) in Malaysia in 2005.  The ASEAN+3 Summit 
exchanged views on regional and international political and security, as well as 
economic issues. We also discussed ways and mechanisms to strengthen the 
ASEAN+3 cooperation and its future direction48. 
The following EAS was held on December 13, 2006 in Metro Cebu, Philippines. After 
the confidence building of the inaugural EAS, the 2006 EAS aimed to help to defining 
the future role of the EAS, its relationship with ASEAN+3, and the involvement of 
Russia in EAS. However, due to Tropical Typhoon Utor, the summit was post-poned 
                                                 
48 Chairman’s Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit Vientiane, 29 November 2004. 
http://www.aseansec.org/16631.htm. 
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until January 200749. After the EAS was established concerning the issues of whether 
any future East Asia Community would arise from the EAS or ASEAN+350. 
4.1.2 EU51
4.1.2.1 Historical Review  
In 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal 
and steel industries of Western Europe. As a result, in 1951, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was set up, with six members: Belgium, West Germany, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. For centuries, Europe was the scene 
of frequent and bloody wars. In the period 1870 to 1945, France and Germany 
engaged in wars three times, with terrible loss of lives. A number of European leaders 
became convinced that the only way to secure a lasting peace between their countries 
was to unite them economically and politically52.  
The ECSC was such a success that, within a few years, these same six countries 
decided to go further and integrate other sectors of their economies. In 1957 they 
signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The member states set 
about removing trade barriers between them and forming a "common market".  
In 1967, the institutions of the three European communities were merged. From this 
point on, there was a single Commission and a single Council of Ministers as well as 
                                                 
49 Bangkok Post - Asean summit may be reset for Jan 8-13 Sun Star - Asean summit shelved ‘effectively’?
50 Report of the East Asian Study Group. 
51 The European Union currently has 27 independent sovereign countries which are collectively known as member 
states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. European Countries. European 
Commission. 
52 European Economic and Trade Office, 
http://www.deltwn.ec.europa.eu/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=63 
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the European Parliament. Originally, the members of the European Parliament were 
chosen by the national parliaments, but in 1979, the first direct elections were held, 
allowing the citizens of the member states to vote for the candidate of their choice. 
Since then, direct elections have been held every five years.  
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced new forms of cooperation between the 
member state governments - for example on defense, and in the area of “justice and 
home affairs”. By adding this inter-governmental cooperation to the existing 
“Community” system, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU).  
Economic and political integration between the member states of the European Union 
means that these countries have to take joint decisions on many matters. So they 
developed common policies in a very wide range of fields - from agriculture to culture, 
from consumer affairs to competition, from the environment and energy to transport 
and trade.  
In the early days, the focus was on a common commercial policy for coal and steel 
and a common agricultural policy. Other policies were added as time went by, and as 
the need arose. Some key policy aims have changed in the light of changing 
circumstances. For example, the aim of the agricultural policy is no longer to produce 
as much food as cheaply as possible but to support farming methods that produce 
healthy, high-quality food and protect the environment. The need for environmental 
protection is now taken into account across the all of EU policies.  
The European Union's relations with the rest of the world have also become important. 
The EU negotiates major trade and aid agreements with other countries and is 
developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
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4.1.2.2 Members-The Growing Family 
The EU has grown in size with successive waves of accessions. Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom joined in 1973 followed by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal 
in 1986 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The European Union welcomed ten 
new countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 
January 2007.  Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are 
also candidate countries. To ensure that the EU can continue functioning efficiently 
with 27 or more members, its decision-making system must be streamlined. That is 
why the Treaty of Nice lays down new rules governing the size of the EU institutions 
and their operation. It came into force on February 1, 2003. 
4.1.2.3 Forging Relations with East Asia     
The European Union wants to prevent conflicts. The EU is the biggest donor of 
financial assistance to troubled places in the world. It is active in peacekeeping and 
peacemaking actions, and it runs many projects that help to make human rights and 
democracy succeed in practical terms.  
The sheer size of the European Union in economic, trade and financial terms makes it 
a world player. The EU has a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements covering 
most countries and regions of the globe. The biggest trader and home to the world’s 
second currency, the EU is also the world's largest contributor in assistance projects. 
Handling the Union’s external relations is literally a global responsibility.  
To expand and deepen relations with other countries and regions, the EU holds 
regular summit meetings with its main partners like the United States, Japan, Canada 
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and, more recently, Russia, India and China, as well as regional dialogues with 
countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Although 
these relationships focused mainly on trade issues at the beginning, they have 
expanded over the years to cover investment, economic cooperation, finance, energy, 
science and technology and environmental protection, as well as political matters such 
as the global war on terror, international crime and drug trafficking, and human rights.  
Besides bilateral relations, the European Union is intensifying relations with 
international organisations (including the UN, Nato and the Council of Europe) and 
regional groupings around the world. In this way, the Union promotes trade and 
investment flows between it and the regions concerned, particularly in Latin America 
and Asia. With its Asian partners, the EU has moved away from a strategy based on 
trade and aid to what it calls enhanced partnerships reflecting a better balance between 
the economic, political, social and cultural elements of their relations. 
4.1.3 North America- NAFTA53 
4.1.3.1 Historical Review 
As Seyom Brown stressed, some neighboring countries tend to regional integration 
cause from attack of environment and for increasing ability so that cooperation for 
challenge54. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA )faced the pressure 
of Europe and urged U.S. President Reagan to abandoned traditional liberalism to 
protectionism on regional policy. In 1985, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney held 
Quebec Summit, and set up United State Canada Trade Agreement (UCFTA) in 1987. 
In 1990, U.S. and Mexico proceeded bilateral trade.  
                                                 
53 Members: Canada , Mexico, United States. 
54 Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System (Blouder, Westview Press,1922):28.  
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NAFTA have been initial ceremony in October 1992. NAFTA called for immediately 
eliminating duties on half of all U.S. goods shipped to Mexico, and gradually phased 
out other tariffs over a period of about 14 years. Restrictions were removed from 
many categories, including motor vehicles and automotive parts, computers, textiles, 
and agriculture. NAFTA has been controversial since it was first proposed. 
Transnational corporations have tended to support NAFTA in the belief that lower 
tariffs would increase their profits. Labor unions in Canada and the United States have 
opposed NAFTA for fear that jobs would move out of the country due to lower wage 
costs in Mexico. Some politicians, economists, and policy experts have opposed free 
trade for fear that it will turn countries, such as Canada, into permanent branch plant 
economies. NAFTA is different from EU and does not overtop government and low. 
The Parties to this Agreement are consistent with national treatment, 
most-favored-nation treatment and transparency55. 
Since NAFTA was signed, it has been difficult to analyze its macroeconomic effects 
due to the large number of other variables in the global economy. Various economic 
studies have generally indicated that rather than creating an actual increased trade, 
NAFTA has caused trade diversion, in which the NAFTA members now import more 
from each other at the expense of other countries worldwide. Some economists argue 
that NAFTA has increased concentration of wealth in both Mexico and the United 
States. 
4.1.3.2 Forging Relations with East Asia 
Comparing with European integration, the members in North America and 
Asia-pacific are overlapping, and in which US is the most powerful country. North 
                                                 
55 North American Free Trade Agreement. Article 101 and 102. 
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America and Asia-pacific have closer relation, because North America is led by the 
U.S. participating in Asia-pacific positively and Asia-pacific adopting “openness”. 
Even in economic crisis, East Asia is an important trade partner and still maintains 
high exportation. Canadian investments in East Asia waere growing after 1990. 
Furthermore, the interaction between Canada and East Asia was more than EU. The 
relation between Mexico and East Asia was in competitive situation, because of 
similar developing economic unity, technology and industry.  
4.2 Supra-Regions: 
4.2.1 EU－East Asia：ASEM56
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), an intra-government forum, was brought up in France 
by Singapore’s prime minister, on October 1994. While burgeoning Asian countries 
wanted to search for new partnerships, a positive Europe wanted to be concerned in 
Asian affairs, the idea that has been actively advanced. In the post-Cold War world, 
Europe is attempting to return to East Asia on a larger scale. It’s bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the US, East Asia and APEC has expanded, mostly because investments in 
Europe and exports to Europe have gained importance for the East Asian countries. 
Europe had to advance relations with East Asia to impede US unilateralism and to 
break “bi-grip policy”.  
On other hand, in facing the challenges of globalization and avoiding being crowded 
out, Asian countries have to increase competitiveness and reduce dependence on the 
US, hence to actively seek cooperation with EU. Both the “Asians” and the 
                                                 
56 The 45 members of the ASEM cooperation are Japan, China, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, South Korea, the 10 
states in the ASEAN alliance (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Viet 
Nam, Myanmar, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia), the ASEAN General Secretariat as well as 
the 27 European Union Member States and the European Commission. 
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EU-Europeans embarked on efforts to strengthen the weak links in trade; trade and 
investment figures indicate that “Europeans” matter greatly in Asia's economies. 
Equally important is the regulatory framework which the EU and the East Asian 
countries devised for managing their respective regionalism and the regulatory 
dialogue between the EU and Japan since 199457. 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) attempted to build a relationship between the two 
regions and needs to be strengthened, reflecting the cooperative structure for 
responding to the fluctuations in international society and an uncertain new century. It 
displayed European ambitious to return in the international arena. Before Singapore 
proposed an EU-Asia summit meeting, in July 1994, the European Commission had 
already published “Towards a New Strategy for Asia”, stressing the importance of 
modernizing relationships with Asia, and of reflecting properly its political, economic 
and cultural significance. The inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit was 
held in Bangkok on 1st & 2nd of March 1996 and was attended by the Heads of State 
and Government from ten Asian nations and 15 European nations, with the Head of 
the Government of Italy also acting as President of the Council of the European Union, 
and the President of the European Commission58. The Commission Communiqué of 
September 2001 (“Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced partnerships”) 
reaffirmed co-operational objectives. 
Accordingly, the EU and members of ASEM have become as crucial as the 
transatlantic (North America-EU) agendas and APEC for the redefinition of 
commercial codes needed for “orderly conduct” of transactions between the 
advanced-industrial nations, required to smooth the passage of “transformation 
                                                 
57 J.Pelkmans and A.Balaoing. “The EU's New Asia Policies: Twinning European and Multilateral Interests.” In 
Towards Rival Regionalism? J. van Scherpenberg and E.Thiel, eds. (Baden-Baden:1998). pp. 205. 
58 http://www.aseminfoboard.org/Summits/ASEM1/ 
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societies” into some form of market economy59. Up to now, ASEM has been held six 
times and expanded one time in 2004, with ten new EU Member States (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia)  as well as three plus ASEAN(10+3) countries for a total of 39 partners. 
4.2.2 North American－ East Asia :APEC60
At the end of WWII, the U.S. dominated the world in every tier of industry, ranging 
from the most technologically sophisticated down to the most standardized 
low-productivity industries, simply because the rest of the industrialized world lay in 
ruins. The U.S. stood on top of the world, enjoying an absolute advantage in every 
single manufacturing industry, as well as in agriculture, forestry, and mining 
(including oil)61. At the beginning of the post-Cold War decade, the thinking behind 
US initiatives for FTA (free trade areas) in the Americas and with willing partners in 
the Near and Far East again assumed that a “large regional market will provide new 
incentives for domestic reforms. By identifying trade and investment obstacles in the 
domestic system the NAFTA could help promote institutional reform . . .”62 Although 
most members of the East Asian community are developing countries, this block will 
not shock the US economy directly, but the political impression and the indicators of 
East Asian FTA would become factors reducing US influence. For the US, since East 
Asia is building an FTA that excludes the US, it will reduce the US’ relative influence. 
Hence, the US paid too much attention to bilateral agreements with East Asian 
                                                 
59 Gustav Schmidt. “Asia, Europe, North America and the "Asian Capitalist Miracle": Changing "Power Cycles" 
and Evolving Roles in Regional and International Structures” International Political Science Review, Vol. 24, (1), 
2003, pp. 74-76. 
60 APEC has 21 members. Australien, Brunei, Chile, Volksrepublik China, Hongkong, Indonesien, Japan, Kanada, 
Südkorea, Malaysia, Mexiko, Neuseeland, Papua-Neuguinea, Peru, Philippinen, Russland, Singapur, Republik 
China (Taiwan), Thailand, USA und Vietnam
61  Terutomo Ozawa “Pax American-led Macro-clustering and Flying-geese-style Catch-up in East-Asian: 
Mechanisms of Regionalized Endogenous Growth”, Journal of Asian Economic. Vol. 13, 2003: 705. 
62  E.Thiel. (1998). “Ambitions and Ambiguities in Current Economic Regionalism.” In Towards Rival 
Regionalism?  J. van Scherpenberg and E.Thiel, eds. (Baden-Baden:1998). pp. 66. 
 41
countries. Furthermore, the US with American countries set up APEC with East Asia, 
one reason being fear that deviation of existent interactional regulations from East 
Asian integration. The other is fear of European influence rising in Asia. Depending 
on interdependence of East Asia and North America, APEC is an organization, a 
communicative arena and tool for cooperation. US influence extends not only to 
NAFTA but also deep into the Asia area, APEC. Now, APEC has 21 members63, 
referred to as “Member Economies,” which account for approximately 40% of the 
world's population, approximately 56% of world GDP and about 48% of world trade.  
APEC is the premier forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region, and is the first inter-governmental grouping in 
the world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and 
equal respect for the views of all participants. Unlike the WTO or other multilateral 
trade bodies, APEC has no treaty obligations required of its participants. Its goals, 
liberalization and high-speed trade and investment, will be achieved in 2020, through 
the “Bogor goals”. However, gaps between members emerged in the 2004 “mid-term 
socktake” for context, form and operational approach as well as the conservative 
attitude in FTAAP64. APEC has no choice but to acknowledge the multiplicity and 
diversity among its members and to emphasize voluntary negotiation. It has caused 
lock of peremptory regime for slowing the liberalization process as well as economic 
and technological cooperation. 
Before the East Asian Community was evident, some Asian countries focused on 
                                                 
63 APEC's 21 Member Economies are Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; 
Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; 
Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States 
of America; Viet Nam. 
64 FTAAP (Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific), Two Reasons: A Fear That a Limited Move on the Doha Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the World Trade Organization and EU Developments.
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APEC. Facing feckless APEC, all members advanced reformative plans, changing 
policy-making approaches from top to bottom, and valuing the summit meetings. 
However, North America offered Mexico and South American countries special trade 
conditions obstructing Asian production, thereby changing the flow of international 
capital and Asia’s dependency tendencies. Among members, although operating on 
the basis of non-binding commitments, political competition still exists. Indeed, 
economic cooperation and multilateral or bilateral conferences are all politicized 
activities. From the US-Japan alliance or liberal forms of economic regionalism to 
rising Chinese power and forming “ASEAN+3”, economic cooperation always 
presents a field for political wars. Interaction in international relations has many types 
of effects in that “spill-over” affects the behavior in reaching objectives. In 
neo-functionalist logic, it implies that conflicts can be overcome by bringing actors to 
cooperate on functional matters, a process leading to a change in preferences and 
ultimately in individual “allegiances.”65
To probe in depth into the East Asian perestroika of the international system, 
consolidating East Asian power and departing from colonial shackles are the main 
directions. The pattern of ASEAN+3 stand out the pattern of APEC66, although North 
America still strongly argues about APEC’s predomination. With the new situation, 
APEC is extending economic cooperation to political issues and “APEC Structural 
Reform”. 1999 dealt with East Timor informally, setting a precedent. Following this, 
anti-terror and anti-nuclear security issues enetered into formal discussions. In 2006 
the Six-Party Talks resumed on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In structure, in 2004 
                                                 
65 Ernst B Haas, “Does Constructivism Subsume Neofunctionalism?” In The Social on Struction of Europe, edited 
by Thomas Christiansen et al.（London: Sage. 2001） pp. 22-31 
66 Asia Regional Integration has been proceeding always towards between East Asianism and Asia Pacificism. 
Those two ways symbolize directly Association of South East Asian Nations, (ASEAN) and Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, (APEC). 
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APEC “One Community, Our Future” emphasized multilateral culture, in 2005, 
“Promoting Community Linkages” and in 2006 and 2007 enhancing Human Security. 
In addition, after the Asian crisis world organizations insisted that East Asia must 
structure reforms. The 2003-2006 APEC “Leaders' Agenda to Implement Structural 
Reforms” through “tailor-made”, “policy-advice” and “ability-building” provides a 
cross-cutting perspective and synergy possibility 67 . As 2007’s APEC title 
“Strengthening our Community, Building a Sustainable Future” indicates, a series of 
action plans are for strengthening members’ relationships.     
Europe, America, and Asia-Pacific are the most obvious regions in the world. But 
compare with integration of Europe and North America, East Asia or Asia-pacific 
seemed to be slowly. For heterogeneity and looser membership in East Asia, Europe 
and North America stipulated the right of members and discrimination. Regards to 
East Asia-31.14 hundred million populations (EU-4.4 and NAFTA-4.3 hundred 
million populations) imply conflict, regional complex and historical complication that 
explain East Asian open regime of regional cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Taipei APEC Study Centers. APEC Structural Reform: Behind-the-border-issues. 
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Chapter 2: The Utility of Power Realignment  
1. Introduction  
The overall aim of this chapter is to propound a theory of international social power 
realignment. From the review of the literature on interregional cooperation, we can 
learn power transformation throughout the research of rising and decline in actors, 
which as the essential concept to reinforce the theory construction. Following part 
identifies typical power changes, particularly international power realignment, to 
interregional co-operation. We propound a competition and cooperation of 
“realignment” for power redistribution in actors’ interaction. Power realignment 
explain power change come from external challenge, willing to against existing 
arrangement, the changing situation and causing a co-governance. In power 
realignment, power must be through a serial communicative structure, and adjust by 
international order inertia. Moreover, a concept arrangement of system. System 
change offer actors an opportunity to reach new roles. The system existing order and 
status quo (limit-unlimited) influence information is controlled or feedback and 
cooperation or isolation of actors. Second section explains that power realignment: 
with globalization and the changing world order, power will have new forms of 
demonstration within dynamic space. The following section is process of equilibrium 
(or unequilibrium). Balance could result from coordinate or exchange form. The 
reasons (market, resource and rules) behind power realignment, supporting the 
solution to the problems related to interregional power pathways. The final section is 
the conclusion. 
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2. The Concept of “Realignment” 
The power realignments in political science are utilized to analyze and explain party 
regrouping and government coalitions or adjustments in public policy. For instance, 
Fred Barnes, Deacon wisely and Rocket Man68 argues that a Republican realignment 
has occurred in the American electorate, by examining whether the Republican party 
has become “dominant” in terms of voter party identification and officeholders. James 
L. Sundquist pointed out that the realignments around the slavery issue in the 1850s 
and the New Deal in the 1930s were considered as the classic examples of 
realignment.69 Power realignments have involved a reorientation of fundamental 
convictions. Power realignments sometimes refer to “critical” events because 
“critical” implies a “crisis”.   
On the international level, the conception of power realignment is utilized in 
analyzing how an emerging actor makes realignment and shifts its interactive 
behavior in the international system. This research defines and analyzes the context of 
power realignment as the ‘periodization’ of power in international politics in order to 
discriminate power shifting from the past. There are four views and opinions to 
express power realignment. First, power realignment implies renewed ascendancy that 
involves “challenging” the fundamental precepts of administration's foreign policy, 
diplomatic maneuvers, regional forms and even the world order. Rustow regard of 
realignment in Middle East70 was not that of the soldier, but of the diplomat and the 
politician: new relationships formed, and new foundations laid, that will decisively 
                                                 
68Fred Barnes. The (Finally) Emerging Republican Majority. Weekly Standard. October 27, 2003. And, what is 
realignment?  http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/004889.php 
69 James L. Sundquist. .Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the 
United States. Brookings Institution Press. (1973)
70 Dankwart A. Rustow. “Realignments in the Middle East”. Foreign Affairs. 7. February, 1984. 
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shape the Middle Eastern constellation to come. William J. Lahneman71 argued that 
misalignment in contemporary world politics means there states rise or decline 
depending on their power structure reaching power-role equilibrium. Both explain that 
the process of realignment throughout a chain of reorientations and readjustments. In 
other words, power realignment is a challenge of the past, not only on the surface, but 
also in the root principles and beliefs, striking at major superpowers in the system. It 
usually represents emerging minatorial events or actors72 that drive the necessary 
conversion of major powers because power is realigned through power sharing. 
Second, the characteristic of power realignment is that its outcome usually goes 
against actors’ arrangements. Events continuously extended from a historical path and 
broke historical rules contrarily.73 Event continuity leads to radical changes, even 
foreshadows a realignment of power in the world. In the world order, the practice of 
power balancing follows a pattern of history from ancient Greece to the modern era, 
such as Britain confronting France and Britain confronting Germany, and all the 
countries joining the United States to confront the Soviet Union.74  
Third, power realignment drags in actors’ attitudes to the changing situation. Actors 
will recalculate reactions that might sometimes break its former will and principles. 
For example, there were two different voices in Washington regarding the rise of 
China- competitor or cooperator. However, after 911 the role of China shifted from 
that of a competitor to that of a partner.75 In addition, the rising of India also indicates 
                                                 
71 William J. Lahneman. “Changing Power Cycles and Foreign Policy Role-power Realignments: Asia, Europe, 
and North America”. International Political Science Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003. pp. 97-111. 
72 The minatorial[0] events or actors in this paper indicate that those could change power distrubtion, or cause 
other actors to establish new foreign policy. 
73 To differentiate between realignment and shifts in world order, realignment stress on actors’ behavior and 
alignment, involving less in great ideology；Power shift is characterize by cognitive analysis and events’ 
involvement is not aimed at actors. 
74 Stanley Kober. The Realignment of the World. South China Morning Post, April 3. 2003 
75 Jia Qingguo. One administration, two voices: US China policy during Bush's first term. International Relations 
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a desire to unite the major countries of Eurasia into a common security organization. 
As P. B. Mehta explained, it results in a greater anti-Americanism around the world 
and may even occasion a more concerted effort to build coalitions to challenge 
American hegemony76. 
Fourth, power realignment refers to modes of governance that center on studying how 
to build and maintain governing coalitions. Alan DiGaetano lays out a theoretical 
framework for modes of governance, which draws on regime theory but goes beyond 
its conception of power structures.77 The realignment was agonizingly slow in sinking 
actors’ roots. Actors have to study different institutions and identify policies to make 
strategic decisions. Some decided to bind themselves closely to the major powers and 
considered a major power as their security guarantee. Other countries adopted a 
different approach by declaring that it would prevent the creation of any opposing 
power by employing preemptive strikes. 
2.1 Communicative Structure 
Apart from the concept and explanation of power realignment, “Communicative 
structure” and “Alienability” are critical operational structure and feature of power 
realignment, respectively. Operation of power realignment results from the social 
system, which is not an entity existing factually in the real system, and is efficacious 
only in the same system. Cooperation and competition are a kind of communicative 
structure. Perceivably, power realignment and competition are a coin with two sides. 
Interest actors have to operate within the wider context of power relations in society. 
Meanwhile, they calculated the reactions of other actors in order to influence their 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Asia-Pacific. Vol.6 (1) 2006. pp. 23-36. 
76 Ibid 5 
77 A DiGaetano. “Urban Governing Alignments and Realignments”. in Comparative Perspective Urban Affairs 
Review, Vol. 32, No. 6, 1997. pp.844-870 
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strategies.78
In history, “power” has remained the most important goal and tool all the time. The 
winner can become the dominator in this world after getting “power.” Realists, 
especially Morgenthau, believe that politics aspires to preserve power (to maintain the 
status quo), to enlarge it (by imperial policy, noting that weak states may represent a 
challenge which strong states can hardly resist) or to demonstrate it.79 However, since 
a realist separates power from the system, he is attracted by the dilemma in trying to 
express the interdependent international system. “Power” always happens via the 
process of interaction. In the contemporary world system, actors have no regard to 
ignore the predominant process of influence among states’ interactions, when actors 
enter in the system and structured hierarchy.  
In summation, power is not a position but a hinge, which means that power will 
happen only through the interaction. We can recognize from the above that in the 
system of power realignment, the hinge structures communicate with, and influence, 
each other. This is a kind of dependence. When one actor is overly dependent on 
others, it becomes highly sensitive and fragile. The ability of negotiation and 
bargaining power becomes low. Nevertheless, the original limitations still remain in 
the anarchic international society, the visible law and invisible agreement (an 
unspoken consensus) effect the capability of cooperation and competition of the 
actors.    
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Theories, Practices, Globalizations. Henri Goverde, Philip G.Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H. Lentner. Eds. 
(London Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2000.) pp. 117. 
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2.2 Alienability  
Although power is a kind of interaction of a hinge system, the hinge system is not of a 
specific shape, but is bound to influence one another in a kind of connected 
relationship. From a historical perspective, however, power always links with interest 
and preferences so that actors are limited to the lowest alienating power. Even though 
power is assignable, it does not mean that the hinge system can control the power. 
Power in the connected structure is always in an ascendant position. Generally, the 
power in this analytic system is standard and comprehensive power, which is different 
from political or economical system. The interaction in the international system, post 
Cold War, peters out the unstable relationship in military and politic. High and low 
politics became blurry, the political and economic systems are integrating, and 
international society is in a transformed structure. Actors have new regulatory policy 
behavior for the international system (power is goal), and the interaction among actors 
is changing.      
How will the system change with the power being incalculable. A unit will increase its 
share when its absolute growth rate is greater than the systemic norm. However, when 
the absolute power changes, the relative growth will accelerate or decelerate is 
incalculable, even when the absolute power does not change. No matter whether 
power means tools, goals or a conception; it radiates invisibly but doubtfully and 
uncontrollably. The complexity of power is arguable in terms of either quantity or 
quality. The international system is holism. Although actors have respective power in 
the system, this increases complexity in a multilateral connection structure. When two 
actors have a conjoint channel, there are two choices: competition and cooperation. 
Actually, the interaction is not so easy to be forecasted in the international system. 
The amount of actor statements is not in direct ratio to the scale of structure if actors 
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can influence diverse issues and most members (even those directly joined in 
interactive behavior), or the level and duration.  
The quality of power signifies acquirement and balance. The outcome of actors’ 
behavior must be considered multilateral, drawn by interior and exterior forces. 
Roughly, the product of interior behavior is foreign policy which is influenced by 
interior history, interest and the unwritten pact of both sides. The exterior is 
influenced by restraints of the international system. According to the complexity of 
power, we can learn that power is doubtful and uncontrollable. Therefore, stability and 
transition are important connotations of quality. Both the stability and transition 
involved in actors’ power operations are known easily, the connected process of 
informational dealings. The balance is covert meaning of power, where knowing how 
to balance is the important interaction behavior.   
In summation, power realignment is not a tempestuous process of change, but a 
judgment on structure. The power realignment is a dynamic process in which power is 
pulled and dragged by power owners; any win-win solution is relative between actors. 
In a vertical structure, power realignment would undergo a series of historical 
trajectories with learning and self-controlling from past and future development 
estimates. In the horizontal structure, unites are interrelation. When systemic change 
abruptly, actors will make use of adapted or conflicting policy in which power is 
realigning.  
3. Pressure for Change 
Judging from the above, power realignment will undergo a series of vertical and 
horizontal developments. It is also a process of systemic change. The change is not 
only allied to geographical structure, but also to the context of global governance’s 
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increasing complexity. After we understand the context of the governance structure in 
power realignment, in this section our concern is to consider the pressure for changing 
the power realignment.  
3.1 Interior Cognition 
Roughly speaking, power change motivation can be classified according to two forces. 
The first force is the interior structure involving cognition, i.e., interior ideology and 
the process of calculation. It includes historical inertia, learning and self-control. 
Actors will adjust cognition when transformation of the system occurs. It does not 
signify a world without world order. Global governance is emerging in international 
political issues and signifies the world order’s existence depending on actors’ 
(dominant states) willingness to manage this complex situation. Hegemony is still in 
contemporary world? Governance predicates that rules and regulations are 
implemented. Robert Gilpin emphasized the significance of hegemony, but in “Global 
Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order” he stressed 
multilateral actors and regional economic organizations playing an important role in 
governance structure. It means that actors have started to adjust the viewpoint of 
hierarchic politics, and also that relative and absolute power change of these 
components in changing the structure of the system reflects each state’s rise and 
decline in terms of systemic share.  
Owing to the changing hegemonic structure, actors are confronted by a changing 
ideology. The changing ideology, however, is always embedded directly in the 
internal political system. Particularly, interdependent interaction will break out 
between various cultures and identities to which they are linked; it threatens rooted 
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identity, culture, political ideology and religion 80 . Mainstream ideology as an 
integration process fused with different cultures in a common arena contributed to the 
lightning development of communications in terms of rapprochement of cultures and 
peoples. To the contrary, its input to global governance might have negative 
consequences for stability when domestic elements become constrained, losing their 
previously highlighted positive potential to stimulate debate and provide space for 
dissent, creating serious conflicts of different ethnicities, religions and ideologies.      
Cognition and self-control are the key points for forming collective-cognition from 
the inherent conditions. Since satisfying self-interest is normal complex behavior, the 
actors must calculate the cost and method to do so easily. The international society is 
complex, so the question arises as to how the actors could prevent potential dangers. 
Actors are like complex persons willing and trying to judge the situation where they 
exist. They find the experience from international history that is similar to their 
distress or they search the empirical strategies from other actors in the contemporary 
scene. In addition, they acknowledge and remember the dangerous events of past ages. 
They learn apologues and try to avoid catastrophes from occurring. If an actor desires 
to struggle for power/interest without limit, the international society falls into a 
disordered and discomposed situation. Observing the behavior of the actors in the 
interaction process who do not base their hypotheses on realism (rational and selfish) 
only on seeking power, contrarily control themselves when they can get more power 
and interest. 
 
                                                 
80 Isakovic Zlatko (2000). Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations. (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate). pp.245-247. 
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3.2 Exterior Challenge 
As Marx said, the element of internal motivation is productivity; the conclusive 
factors are production and reproduction in real life. The development of productivity 
determines relationships based on human necessity. The competition among actors in 
international relations is a contradiction in the system and a kind of motivational force 
for promoting system development. An actor carries out some policies and acts in a 
kind of synergy. Like North explained, “Institutional changes in organizational 
economics, the direction of change includes both external sources of change and 
unanticipated consequences of internal policies, which may weaken the power of 
existing organizations, strengthen or give rise to organizations with different interests 
and change the path”81. Both explain that systemic adjustment involves internal 
ideation and exterior competition. 
The second force involves the external competition and conflict of states in an 
interdependent world which is without international sovereignty and therefore without 
a proper Hobbesian social contract to ensure stability, peace and the progress of 
civilization. Its lack of a world government or sovereign power, may actually be 
transformed someday into real, violent, chaotic anarchy should the tenuous and fragile 
existing balances of power among potentially hostile states deteriorate. Such a 
condition would undermine states from within as well as from without by destroying 
their integrity and stability82. How could they operate and manage the complex and 
inharmonious relationships among actors? We interpret it from two points: one is 
interest-seeking, and the other, conflict-management.  
                                                 
81 North D.C.” Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis” in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, (Cambridge University Press, 1990): pp. 5. 
82  Henri Goverde,Philip G.Cerny,Mark Haugaard,Howard H. Lentner. “General Introduction: Power in 
Contemporary Politics.” in Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations. Henri Goverde, 
Philip G.Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H. Lentner. Eds. (London Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000) 
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Interest seeking is the actors’ goal in international politics. The interest is to satisfy the 
requirements for the actor to exist and develop; these are a fundamental motivator and 
direct goal, as well as the start and end result for an actor joining in the world order. 
The capabilities that allow great powers to compete with each other are tied to cycles 
of technological and economic development83. Some scholars classify the interest 
according to different aspects relating to importance, sub-divided into 
fundamental-interest and common-interest; with time divided into long-interest and 
short-interest; space is sub-divided into internal-interest and external-interest. In 
addition, some scholars consider, like realism, relative power/interest affects the 
actors acting; some scholars consider, as with liberalism, that absolute interest is the 
standard. After all, it is involved in capability parity and leadership. As the system 
changes and leadership is contested, new priorities emerge. 
For controlling conflict, it is necessary to reduce the degree of severity, meaning that 
actors’ influence. Diez, Stetter and Albert conceptualize an ideal-typical model of 
conflict stages84, each stage represents degree securitization of conflict. From the 
desire for stability, in conflict, actors construct and communicate their identities and 
interests in relation to other actors, the overall identity or interests of which are seen 
as compatible and conditioned with that of another group. However, with overlapping 
zones on a continuum, conflicting episodes increase the difficulties of management. 
The impact operates most efficiently in situations of membership negotiations, while 
it loses much of its power without such concrete offers and once membership has 
been attained. 
                                                 
83G. Modelski. Long Cycles in World Politics.（London：MacMillan. 1987）. 
84 The model of stages of conflict is formed with four stages (1) conflict episode (2) Issue conflict (3) Identity 
conflict (4) subordination conflict. Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (2006).The European Union 
and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration. Cambridge University Press.pp.567-569.  
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4. Actors’ Interaction and Adjustment   
4.1 Gap- Changing Perception  
Regarding of the above discussion, we may argue that power realignment is a 
conception of power-roles. Foucault considered that power consists in how they 
operate and manage the complex and essentially disharmonious relationship between 
the individual and society. Robert Dahl developed a language of power analysis which 
contained a number of concepts including the difference between power and resources. 
Power is synonymous with the exercise of power as manifest in the decision-making 
process in which identifiable actors are observed to prevail over others85. It explains 
that power must be acquired and can alter some episodes, behaviors and decisions. 
Power can be viewed as a contestation concept, goal or tool. We can be aware of the 
behavior of power by which actors want to reach out to such an extent that they can 
obtain something they want. Therefore, power is not equal to wealth but rather 
approximates a kind of influence, a kind of control and force and a kind of the ability 
to satisfy interests.  
As compared with power, role is similar to a kind of characterization, the actor makes 
some policies, which unfold in the activities that it wants in the world. Role is foreign 
policy behavior that the system has allowed the state to achieve86. Therefore, the role 
involves the concerns and ends of statecraft. Like power, role is necessary in the 
system, determined primarily by what a government itself does; a role exists only if 
the other governments accept this informal legitimization process87. In fact, the 
                                                 
85 Henri Goverde. Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations. (London ; Thousand Oaks, 
Calif. : SAGE,2000). pp.25 
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components of a unit’s role and power are interdependent with those of other states 
because each state’s role and power component contribute to the total amount of role 
or power in the system88. Power and role both have to be calculated and understood in 
determining what may accrue or prove to be a fault (gap) in power realignment. 
Dorn’s power-role gap explains how the differential absolute growth of the units 
(states) creates the single structural dynamic of the system, and, consequently, the 
relating structure and agency of a state's relative power trajectory as well as its 
associated foreign policy (systemic) role expectations89.  
4.2 Critical Point  
The adjustment of international order faces single or a series of episodes that break 
out in critical points. “Whether dose the international society that must change 
through a destructive event, like the scale of war?” is an emphasized issue in 
international relations. As argued above, transitional ideology and cognition change 
conflict management medium. Some scholars see the causal impact of the critical 
point on major wars; in long cycle theory, each cycle is born in major warfare; the 
military power is able to support its economic goals, especially benefiting from world 
trade that it more or less monopolized 90 . War signifies annihilation while 
interdependent interactions reduce certain war incidence; in other words, actors have 
show prudence regarding war happening as the consequences are so serious. In the 
past cold war, the realism had been challenged by the balance of power and the ideal 
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of war; the contemporary version of conflict does not focus only on military and 
aircraft but also on the “soft” power, especially economic interest.  
If war is not the only critical point, how does the realignment happen? Although, war 
is not the only point for adjusting structure, it doesn’t mean order won’t change. There 
are many factors hidden in the circulation of international relations. The different 
interests and unequal distributions among actors, imbalanced political and economic 
development among states or regions, will cause the international powers to change. 
Actors start to care about relative power in relation to other actors, as with the power 
cycle theory argument. The non-line happened unexpectedly and suddenly, and actors 
experienced security and interests changing in relative comparative power. Finally, 
actors sought capability equal to their foreign policy role, and then acted. Each 
relative power rising and declining meant one critical point was ready to occur. 
4.3 Attempts  
The changing power-role relation increases or declines gap among states in 
international system, which also change states’ perception of power orientation. In 
different period actors have to build a set of political behavior model to calculate and 
choice ration action. For example, in the past military superiority was the only way to 
gain power. If power as for behavior expansion, however, prestige or tool of interest 
goal that might be weaken in interdependent system, so that economic demand, 
welfare and satisfied becomes more important. With emancipation of non-politic and 
soft power (social-economic), military power has became relativity in dominant 
position, which even appeared in other aspect, traditional power has been expressed in 
power projection forces91. Different power forms would not disappear but adjustment 
                                                 
91 Ulrich Albrecht. Internationale Politik. (München: Oldenbourg.1992). pp. 167. 
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of relative ratio, for which actors have to change its cognition and attempts.   
Facing complexity of political and economic transformation and eventual openness 
actors will make new alternative policies. In Manfred Knapp’ study92 about relation 
United State-Germany explored that it was hard to deduce that dependence and 
interdependence among states, but expressed the gap of power lead multidirectional 
dependent relation among hegemonic and weaken states which forming 
“interdependence of interdependences”. It means in first leave exists dependent 
network which forming another interdependence- “Delta-interdependence” of which 
existing asymmetric relation and difference-interdependence. For the complex 
interdependent situation, actors have to find a compromise to avoid incorrect 
adjustment.           
5. Counterbalance 
The process of realignment is a series of dynamic adjustments. International society, 
however, goal of absolute balance is unapproachable. Each realignment as a balance 
process involves history and reality, intrinsic and extrinsic contradictions that lead to 
more difficulties in maintaining balance.  
5.1 Process of Balance 
The existing institution offers actors a channel to accomplish their interests. With the 
anarchy, collapse of bipolarity and transformation of ideology, international society 
needs a manageable mechanism for a more stable situation. Actor interacts by 
institution that we can regard as a kind of game where loss and win be viewed in 
                                                 
92 M. Knapp. Politische und Wirtschaftliche Interdependenzen im Verhältnis USA- Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
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terms of cost and profit. If the structure of interaction is a kind of game, how can the 
transformation be made stable and coordinated, not subject to collapse and 
apprehension.   
Figure 2 shows the strategic choices an actor faces in a changing international society: 
processing cost, international tendencies, and connective technology93 may impact 
changes in diplomatic policy. If actors can accept the change, it becomes easy to 
achieve balance. If the cooperation entails higher price and the bargaining strength is 
unaffected94, actors tend to label it as unacceptable policy. No matter whether it be 
negotiation, cooperation or competition, existing bias and interests of power constitute 
the important motivation. As realist insist on power that is the essential tool for 
accomplishing goals. Maintaining power is gaining interest. For reasons mentioned 
above, actors will choose which paths are better for keeping power. After negotiations, 
if actors can successfully conclude, it tends towards balance. By contrast, negotiations 
may break down and countries colliding will engage in conflict.  
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Figure 2: Actors’ Strategic Choices   
Actors 
Acceptable 
Negotiation
Tendency to balance 
Compromise Breakdown
Tendency to conflict 
Collide 
Unacceptable
 
Source: the Author  
Generally, stability is the goal that international actors want to gain, but fluctuation is 
the normality in international society; institution building is apodictic but existing 
inertia is the other problem. Actors face the question as to which condition they must 
create or which institute to change, which motivation they need in order to change it. 
Institution is a public good is lack of power so that need some selected motivation to 
stimulate actors to increase innovation. The limiting of interest is important; for 
example, the control power of rules to restrain potential competitors to avoid easy 
free-riders. Free-riders hide from operating and innovating. Furthermore, ideology, 
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which exists or changes, would influence whether or not the institute will be 
successful. Due to the ideological divergence making international society constantly 
experience uncertainty, but priority countries are able to permit changes. 
5.2 Co-Governance   
When world entered into Millennium, international society has became more 
incalculability, across boundary and multidimensional governance, in United Nations 
“Millennium Declaration” has reveled placing importance on cooperation and good 
governance. There are three main contexts in this declaration: 1.) uphold the 
principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. 2.) Building 
cooperation and governance between states and civil society aim to develop civil 
society. 3.) Advancing international cooperation from developed countries support 
economic resources, sharing experience of political development which promoting 
modernization in developing countries95. Founding on connotation of “Millennium 
Declaration”, we advance “co-governance” in this paper to explain cooperation in 
interaction and try to “good governance” in competition, across boundary and 
multidimensional situation.  
Prakash and Jeffrey considered that transformation of governance cone from 
competition of technologic transformation, expanding market regime, inner politic 
and government, and then lead globalization for which is not only variable of 
governance transformation, and also depend variable of technologic transformation, 
expanding market regime, inner politic and government 96 . Globalization regards 
liberalism and individualism as core ideology, which viewing world as a single unity. 
                                                 
95 United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000. 
96 Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart.(Eds.), Globalization and Governance. (London: Rutledge.1999) pp. 1-24 
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It also tells us external element might change the role of nation-states, anthropogenic 
political boundary and forming barrier-free environment for international interaction 
that change the past pattern of interconnection. In contemporary age, globalization 
stimulates economic market, politics, society, and culture….etc. in the world, causing 
the tendency of government reform97.           
Co-governance moves transformation of traditional governance pattern through global 
cross-boundary relation to political integration that includes global civil society. 
According to Rhodes’ study98 pointed out governance as a socio-cybernetic system 
that reflect social power from state to society meaning re-thinking of states-society 
and stressing the sharing power between government and civil society. In 
Co-governance, no matter European concept or liberalism of civil society place 
emphasis on an independent situation opposite to politics. It involves in certain 
elements: 1.) Global issues. 2.) Inter-connection of cross-boundary. 3.) International 
organization. 4.) Multidimensional linkage99. Therefore, we can explain co-governance 
cause from global issues, dealing with inter-connection of cross-boundary and be a 
long-term action. Co-governance combines with different arena, level and issues, 
from domestic issues to global issues (global issues are also domestic issues).      
In sum, internal affairs is common and been considered by countries and 
organizations. In theory, those issues solved by game theories or framework of 
sovereignty would be insolubility. Co-governance tries to find a new regime to 
arrange multifarious network, through state and solidarity of regional countries 
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seeking cooperated and coordinated governance.  
5.3 Counter-Line 
Whether International society appears pareto-inferior or Nash equilibrium, it must 
pass through the rational-choice process; it is still possible to maintain equilibrium 
within predicaments. At each time point in history, there is the “record” of each 
actor’s clearly defined past trajectory, on which the diplomats depended, to estimate 
the yet-to-be-determined future trajectory vis-à-vis the system. In addition to 
interdependent and complete international relations, the next step became multiform. 
In general, the critical point resulted in ideology transition or the international 
situation changing so that actors became aware of the role and power gap. The 
balance always stays in the situation with tolerance of different belief systems as its 
ideology. Actors will protest against the attacker when ideology is challenged. The 
ideology cannot be aggressed; nevertheless, the states try to negotiate before the 
critical point becomes out of control. The actors would try to adjust to structural 
change at the critical point that is strained by the power-role gap, which is suddenly 
squeezed to the surface of foreign policy consciousness and appears formidable 
indeed, as the state and system try to cope with the shifting tide100. 
In new institutionalism, the process of change is determined by path dependence. 
North101 recognized that growth and improvement are not inevitable, however. Path 
dependence can also lead to stagnation or decline. This is because institutions are not 
established for their social efficiency. When the event happens, they will be 
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established to serve the interests of those who are powerful enough to establish them. 
As new institutionalism argues, uncertainty leads dominate states to weigh their 
interest and loss; if the event is great enough to change the distributions among the 
states, they will start to solve the gridlock. It is not only rules and organization but 
also informal communication, which can mitigate ideological conflict.  
In summation, the line of the international system shift was full of intrusion and 
counter-lines, which were difficult to forecast, and which resulted from a critical point. 
On the change of power, the sudden critical point is the key element; unanticipated 
change by which the projection of future relations, hence of future security and 
foreign policy role, changes abruptly.   
6. Conclusions  
The purpose of this section is to theorize for this paper’s analytic model. Under the 
international order of globalization, the essence of power did not change, but it still 
needs a connective structure to appear. Power complex cannot be absolutely revealed 
by quantification. The paper stresses rethinking past power analyses; power 
realignment has to go through a long-term communicative process for sharing power. 
This series within the process has cultural conflict, historical trajectory, divergent 
foreign policies and mutual agreement.  
In international society, power changing bounds to a rising actor or an awakening 
existing power. Globalization offers the chance for followers to get into the 
international social core where they can influence international rules. Globalization 
affords states new thinking, to raise collective power beyond the states. The process of 
policy-making for collective power is full of regional special behaviors. Foreign 
policies are different from the international order that the west is building. Dynamic 
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space is being shaped. Each actor is a point connected to other actors, framing an 
interacting system. This system is involved in the conception of governance. 
Conception of governance offers an analyzable viewpoint to understand actors’ 
changing ideology, roles and diplomatic policy. It can also understand which 
tendencies will be adopted when actors face change.  
Whether power is always balanced must be contingent on the outcome of actors’ 
attitudes and co-governance. International politics is, however, incalculable and the 
order change is dilatory. With actor’s cognition under a transpicuous information 
communication and cognition of ability and roles, it is unlikely that divergences will 
cause an unbalanced status. Under this situation, actors have to take notice of 
fluctuations in international society and engage inappropriate behavior to avoid 
unbalance. This is the conception of dynamic balance.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: East Asia’s Historical Sphere of Influence  
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1. Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss East Asian development and causing a new order. 
We are interested in knowing if East Asian involvement in international and 
interregional institutions has affected its foreign policy behavior. There are three parts 
in this chapter concerning the analysis of East Asian integration and influence. The 
first is what is the history and influence of East Asia? The second concerns more 
fundamental changes in East Asia and how the emerging East Asia has caused a 
changing order? The third part of the analysis calculates interests and strategies of 
East Asian conception in international politics.  
Here we have to define subjects in this research, East Asia community is planed an 
“open” regional organization, but it regards ASEAN + 3 countries as core, and 
ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea have been key roles in East Asian history. 
Therefore, we only discuss about relation among those countries.       
The most outstanding element of East Asia emerging is the international social 
transformation which offers chances for new challenges is more difficult than it was 
in the bipolar-age, because actors must be more careful in interdependent relations. 
The new order is a symbol of a new start but it does not mean disengagement from 
past historical processes, which have remained and continue to proceed. East Asia had 
held an important role relation to its geographical features and history in which there 
are different power bases. In other words, geographical features and history is namely 
internal willing (regional inrertia) affect policy-making.  
 
2. The Development of East Asia and Political Economic Regimes 
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2.1 The Development of East Asia -The Historical Review 
East Asia’s civilization is one of the oldest in the world and plays an important role in 
world history. From the 16th century, Spain, Portugal and the Netherland started to 
communicate with East Asia directly and established sea-trade and import. Cash crops 
and weapons influenced East Asia the most (especially China and Japan) in terms of 
food supply and military capability. The influence unconsciously changed the 
historical trajectory. The development of international politics started in Europe and 
moved across all of civilization. The Far East trade demand had supplied an 
inducement for European forces to develop colonialism, and gave rise to capitalism 
and the industrial revolution. East Asia underwent the period of European 
enlargement in the past. 
Uncertain international society, interaction among states and cooperation among 
regions had been written in history. The development of international order account 
that why and when to change; historical trajectory appear that how to develop and 
who will be the key role. In the 19th century the development of Europe and East Asia 
had revealed an enormous gap and material superiority of the emerging powers; 
Britain, France and the U.S. oppressed China, Japan and Korea, the three oldest 
“Kingdoms” to become incorporated into a European-core international political and 
trade system. East Asia was undergoing transition. East Asia’s entering into present 
international order is emerging. The importance of politics and the economy are 
increasing.  
East Asian development and the Asian miracles are incredible with the U.S. as the 
hegemony of market capitalism. The U.S. has created and maintained a global 
environment for trade, investment, and structural upgrading for those countries that 
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are willing to follow its leadership by adopting a regime of market democracy. Pax 
Americana “hegemony-led macro-clustering” had disseminated technology, 
knowledge, skills, market information, and demand (via access to the hegemony’s 
home markets) contributed to some higher level countries’ labor productivity and 
efficiency；the low-development countries can “free ride” on the stimuli in East Asian. 
The process of hegemony-led industrial development is the so-called “flying-geese” 
theory, in which a certain industrial sector can be identified as the main engine of 
structural transformation into a higher value-added level102.   
The U.S. was the first goose to lead East Asia into following countries evolving 
post-war economic development. The U.S. stood on top of the world, enjoying an 
absolute advantage, which was an effective tool in all industries and assisted other 
countries, especially East Asia in the context of the U.S. Cold War diplomacy. The 
U.S. always regarded East Asia as an important strategic region. Japan in particular 
benefited enormously from this American trade policy and came to play the second 
important role for East Asia’s catch-up industrialization. Japan’s step-by-step 
industrial upgrading has had an impact on the industrialization pattern of other East 
Asian countries.  
In economy and science and technology Japan still has the prominent position. 
Currently, China has been getting a strategic and economical advantageous position, 
and Korea has a key position in the world system. There are indications that the trend 
shows that Northeast Asia has the capability to become a new inner circle in world, 
but roughly, those countries’ division and cooperation of labor and trade integration 
are tightly controlled under the framework of WTO（World Trade Organization）and 
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APEC（Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation）.  
In terms of political security, regional historical problems cause certain political 
interpretations in some countries and latent consciousness of strategic competition. 
Even though the cold war had ended, the U.S. and Russia still have a certain influence 
in the region that connects these regional affairs with complex world strategy 
international networks. In other words, this region was divided by different colonial 
powers and by ideology, as well as ethnicity, religion, and culture 103 . The 
characteristics of Southeast Asia, after World War , was always conflict, turmoil Ⅱ
and political instability. In Northeast Asia Japan, Korea and Taiwan continuously 
developed economical and political structure, but the Korean Peninsula and 
cross-strait tensions are obvious political problems; some countries have experienced 
national friction after WWII. At the same time, China and North Korea played the role 
of dangerous actors.  
Although the ideological confrontation of the Cold War blocks ended in 1980s, the 
U.S. bilateral treaty-based alliance system lives on, serving different situations. It was 
quite obvious that many Asian countries depended on U.S. defense. However, the 
United States defense capabilities have worn thin over time, especially concerning 
Iraq and Asian states faced with America’s primacy and shows of force, have 
sometimes emphasized regional cooperation. In February of 1995, the U.S. 
Department of Defense issued a report on the United States security strategy for East 
Asia, to the effect that American forces would have to stay in Japan and Korea until 
at least the year 2015. It indicates that the U.S. has had to rethink its East Asian 
policy. Chalmers Johnson argued that the future is clear for both Korea and Japan, 
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neither of them will depend any longer on American troops for their security104. Still, 
China as a “strategic competitor” has played a vital role. Chinese views of world 
order, and its stated preference for a multi-polar world, cause its support for the 
Unites States to be more equivocal in East Asia’s policy105.   
Indeed, East Asian countries also pay attention to the UN. The UN is not 
inconsequential to Asians. Many Asian states have offered peacekeeping forces and 
other support to the UN. The Chinese government uses its position as permanent 
member of Security Council to protect its national interest with increasing deftness106. 
The Japanese government’s support for the UN is deeper than that of other Asian 
states, to increase its ability and position in international society to maintain security.      
With the end of the Cold War, international relations were no longer based on the 
polarizing confrontation between two superpowers, giving regional organizations an 
opportunity to take a leading role in conflict management. Geographic proximity to 
the conflicts provided strong incentives to re-establish peace and security in this 
region; the role of regional organizations in conflict settlement also went beyond 
simply providing disputants with good offices107. In another opinion, when global 
order is transforming, this gives sub-regions or sub-organizations the chance to create 
new ambitions and new roles. In transitional international society, the EU’s 
experience has shown that a regional organization could take a more effective and 
active role in the international system. In this condition, East Asia has obtained a new 
entrance ticket for re-establishing new influence and roles.    
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2.2 Features of Development  
In many countries, the economy cannot be separate from political, colonial and 
international aid influences. In Northeast Asia, Japan and Korea intimate the U.S.A; 
Hong Kong intimates Britain. Coalitions and breakups relied on colonization as well. 
In South-East Asia, the British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah joined 
Malaya to form the enlarged Federation of Malaysia. Due to subsequent political 
disagreements, Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965.  
However, East Asian characteristics appeared little different from Western ones. As 
compared with the individualism in Western culture, East Asian’s political and 
economical regimes are nearer to Community, which is not equated to corporatism108. 
In other words, the behavior in west culture is guided by the pervasive sense of right 
and wrong, which is a guilt culture. Contrariwise, East Asia belongs to a shame 
culture. Especially in Japan’s society, the shame culture is expanded, because the 
individual efficiency-maximizing is less important than communality. 
The general features of East Asian development are well known; fast economic 
growth over three decades has been accompanied by a very rapid pace of capital 
accumulation and a strong rise in exports as a share of output, which together have 
helped shift the dynamic fulcrum of the economy towards industrial activity. While 
this strong economic performance suggests a shared experience among countries in 
the region, there has been a growing awareness of differences among the countries of 
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East Asia in terms of the specific policies and institutions used to accelerate 
industrialization and achieve rapid economic growth109.  
The different development experience and interrelationships between Northeast Asia 
and Southeast Asia were obvious. Northeast Asia stayed in the first-tier; it paid 
attention to establishing policy mechanisms and institutions, management of 
economic rents etc. The size and non-rural economic structure have been distinct 
influences on the scope of industrial diversification, reliance on FDI and 
infrastructural needs in Hong Kong and Singapore110. But striking institutional and 
structural differences also exist among the three economies whose development paths 
share the closest resemblance, namely Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
All of the Northeast Asian governments tried to guarantee certain basic conditions for 
investment by maintaining political stability and creating a “pro-investment” 
macroeconomic climate. “Pro-investment” is a better description of East Asian 
macroeconomic policies than stable or low-inflationary, because some of these 
governments were willing to tolerate a fair degree of inflationary pressure for the sake 
of boosting investors' confidence. Southeast Asia was second-tier and many of these 
measures were first employed in agriculture; public investment in agricultural 
infrastructure and services, favorable incentives, including subsidized credits, and 
agricultural research have played an important role in facilitating investment in 
agriculture and improving productivity111 . Their development strategy relies on 
raising investment rates while attracting foreign capital through domestic and 
international financial liberalization. The resulting capital inflows, and the wide array 
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of projects that these funds finance, produce a boom in the economy, providing an 
aura of long-lasting, if not ever-lasting, growth.     
The East Asian crisis destroyed the East Asian miracle; the Thailand economic 
collapsed abruptly influenced Asian countries (except Taiwan). The crisis was 
evidence of: macroeconomic volatility, lack of corporate and bank transparency, 
incompetent management of the maturity and currency composition of bank assets 
and liabilities, inadequate regulatory and supervisory institutions, moral hazards, bank 
fragility and political interference in bank management in most East Asian countries. 
The event is important because most developing economies are plagued by domestic 
distortions. They can be in the form of market imperfections or government-generated 
protectionism. They can be associated with imperfect or asymmetric information in 
financial markets, or with negative externalities in goods markets. 
In East Asia, Japan and least-developed countries (LDC) of Southeast Asia produced 
something unique; however, the difference between Northeast Asia and Southeast 
Asia is one reason why integration is difficult, but it is also an inducement to 
cooperate. In 1995, for the first time ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea, met in 
Malaysia and produced the “Declaration for the 21st Century” which was the new 
start to improving East-Asian cooperation, via the “10+3” cooperation mechanism. It 
elucidate that cooperation could also be complementary and equal, even though they 
are in different developmental level. It is necessary to know that this cooperation has 
geographical strategy, which enough to neglect culture diversity.  
2.3 Sinking or Rising 
East Asia had been built on sand, and rapid development resulted in economic crisis in 
mid-1970. The rapidity and severity of the crisis caught both academics and 
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policy-makers by surprise. East Asia was weakened by the economic crisis. It gave, 
however, a chance to reconstruct the structure of East Asia and rethink the necessity 
for East Asian integration. The first start of the East Asian economic cooperation 
followed the Asia financial crisis in 1997. The region had experienced phenomenal 
economic growth in preceding years, leading many scholars to proclaim that the 
twenty-first century would belong to Asia. As economist Colin Bradford demonstrated, 
the East Asian NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) are not simple models of pro 
free market, neoclassical liberalism, but are complex mixes of market forces, public 
policies, and government intervention, that is, successful development based both 
upon import substitution (state) and export promotion (market) forces working 
together consistently112. 
As argued above, the East Asian crisis destroyed East Asian growth. It is the first 
critical point. Subsequently, Japan’s economic recession and a rising China all 
changed the trajectory of East Asian development. In the process of East Asian 
industrialization, Japan had been always the locomotive since the early 1970’s; Japan 
started to move the labor-intensive industries to Asia’s four tigers, because of local 
labor wages uptrend, problem of burgage and environmental protection, etc. Japan 
thus influenced countries’ economic growth.          
The regional role of Japan has changed since the mid-1980s. The strong appreciation 
of the yen, emergence of new competitors in labor-intensive manufactures, 
protectionist pressures in the other major industrial countries and domestic 
macroeconomic pressures led to a significant increase in Japanese FDI in the region: a 
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first wave going to the first-tier NIEs after the yen appreciation in 1985, followed by a 
new wave in the early 1990s to the second-tier NIEs and, in particular, to China113. 
If there is superpower in one region, the region should not be doing badly. By 
contrary, if there are only destitute countries in the region, it is very difficult to gain 
enrichment. In history, world economic development always strings along with some 
superpower, because the pulling force can promote the development of surroundings. 
Without Japan’s irradiating action, East Asia could not develop so rapidly. Japan 
plays an important role in the development path in East Asia, and may be viewed as 
both conductor and transmitter. China, however, has risen abruptly and Japan’s 
economic recession has reversed the normal or measurable pathway, while neighbors 
have changed some policies to catch the free-driver wave with China to enhance their 
interests.  
On the other part, the U.S., upon which East Asian countries depend, has overlooked 
and absented itself from the ASEAN cooperation mechanism, giving China a chance 
to expand its influence in East Asia by the foundation of ASEAN cooperation 
mechanism utilizing “10+1” and “10+3” dialogue mechanism and become the main 
force to predominate within East Asia integration. Once U.S. power moderates in East 
Asia, Japan’s economic leadership position will be affected.   
In East Asian integration, China has been a positive participator and an important 
propellant. China is the first to make the free-trade area push forward to other 
countries which adopt more a positive attitude for free-trade security. Also, China had 
negotiated with Japan and Korea and announced a trilateral joint declaration. At the 
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same time, China and Asia’s volume of trade reached 2.729 trillion dollars, increasing 
by 42.4％, for the most part dealing with the East Asian area. According to China’s 
foreign policy, China wants to delve deeply into international affairs in order to 
establish its role of world power. International structure changing regional 
organization plays a crucial role which is China’s important tool and policy to connect 
international level.  
If the ASEAN-China free-trade area materialized, there will be an economic arena 
with 2 billion populations and over 2 million total productive values. In population, it 
will be extreme as a free-trade area; in economic scale, it is inferior to NAFTA and the 
EU. If the ASEAN-China free-trade area, however, integrates with Japan and Korea, 
it will further build up the “East Asian free-trade area” which will become one of 
triangle-power competitors with North America and the EU in politics and economy; 
China can spring up in international political and economic roles by leading 
east-Asian integration.  
The Western polarization of ideology between pro free market (liberalism) and 
government intervention (economic nationalism) does not fit here anymore than it 
does in the corporatist political economies of Northern Asia. Rather, the terminology 
of collective learning and positioning theory is useful here in distinguishing between 
the “stabilization” policies critical for an effective maintenance base (consensual 
agreements among government, labor, and corporate management) and the export 
promotion and innovative sector targeting and adaptation policies that make up the 
entrepreneurial side of the dynamic NICs economy (forming a “mainentpreneurial” 
synthesis, the most advanced form of which is, no doubt, the Japanese example)114.  
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Regarding security, as argued above, China’s rising power has changed the calculated 
path. In combination with a presumed U.S. strategic withdrawal, it could in turn 
provide the impetus for Japan to adjust its security doctrine, with repercussions for 
the remaining states in the region115. That Chinese leaders have shown greater 
commitment to multilateral security organization is surprising given the core values 
that tend to be associated with the country. In addition, some East Asian states were 
fearful of America’s superiority having tended towards regional cooperation.  
3. Integration of East Asia and the New Order 
Changing international society offers a chance for actors to develop but with greater 
complexities. Is the integration of East Asia is a kind of regionalization or a kind of 
transformation of ideology, or both? International society is a correlated system in 
which actors have learning and self-control abilities. For example, in our case, the 
integrating of the EU has played a role in transforming the international order by 
enhancing high unitization with other regions; regionalization, NAFTA and East Asian 
integration have been deeply affected. In the past, East Asia has experienced glory, but 
also downfall. Learning from international society, East Asia has started to change. 
However, what is the central ideology of the pattern of East Asian integration that is 
different from past regionalization? Will it lead to a new international order? In the 
present age, European and American hegemonies have compelled East Asia to receive 
exotic culture and international order, but oriental inherent culture has created a 
divergent development path from that of the west. 
3.1 Regionalization or ‘Asian-ization’? 
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In the past, East Asia was regarded as a geographical conception. In general, it 
includes Northeast and Southeast Asia’s 10 countries. From a social, political and 
economic viewpoint, the Asia-Pacific region is highly diverse. Some writers find that 
not only is any geographical definition of the region inevitably somewhat arbitrary, 
but so too its name116. Above all, in order to analyze influence of East Asia’s 
integration and cooperation, we must qualify the traditional geographical description 
of “region”, avoiding the problem of conceptualizing a regional definition.  . 
There has been an increasing emergence, and perception, of East Asia (Asia-Pacific) 
as a region. This geographical definition has been conceptually portrayed in response 
to changing economic circumstances as well as to individual or cultural bias. The 
concept “Pacific Century” emerged during the 1970s and 1980s when U.S. trade with 
Asia exceed trade with Europe. The term “Pacific Asia” (Appendix 1: Pacific Asia) 
appears to be a regional descriptor used both by Asians and Anglo-Americans; the 
term “Asia-pacific” (Appendix 2: the Asia-Pacific region), on the other hand, is used 
principally within the region117. In this paper, the region will be referred to the 
opening regional organization and ASEAN, with Japan, Korea and China as the axis. 
With the end of the Cold War and increasing economic globalization, there has been a 
burgeoning of international groupings, for instance trade blocks such as the EU and 
NAFTA118. Additionally, increasingly complex international interaction promotes the 
integration of East Asia. As in the integrated processes of the EU and North America, 
there are central leader(s) who guide regional development for cohering centripetal 
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force and identification. However, the roles influencing East Asia are complex. In 
East Asian arena, two major powers in Asia, namely China and Japan, one 
superpower-U.S. and one regional organization-ASEAN compete for leadership.  
ASEAN had been weakened by the problems associated with its increased 
membership, leadership and self-confidence as a result of the economic crisis. The 
ASEAN has been called, however, “one of the most constructive and consequential 
groupings in the world.”119 ASEAN is not strongly integrated and can hardly be seen 
as a happy family or even achieving internal agreement. The ASEAN states do not 
always share the same views or interests, and bilaterally there are numerous 
unresolved disputes between the members, even including territorial claims. In 
function of regional cooperation, ASEAN is like a buffer arena and linkage point. 
Even if there is some disputed territory between the ASEAN states and China, it is 
trying to develop a positive relationship with China. ASEAN with its “soft power” 
diplomacy between Beijing and Washington, supported China’s entry into the 
WTO120. In addition, it follows Japan’s development policy: support resources and get 
technology. In this environment, the once nearly dormant ASEAN has become 
increasingly pro-activist in the 1990s, e.g., Malaysian prime minister Mahathir 
Mohamad brought up the establishing of an East Asian economic conference (EAEC); 
in 1995, ASEAN addressed the conception of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and south 
Korea).  
With U.S. help in attaining growth and following U.S. policy, Japan has always paid 
attention to their relationship with the U.S. more than with East Asia. Now the 
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situation is changing; world economic and political affairs are bringing change to Asia. 
Increasing trade and investment and economic blocks are established, in comparison 
with the past, this region is more unique. During the past three decades, East Asia has 
already had development; Japan cannot but turn back Asian regionalism and draw up 
a new regional policy.  However, Japan has always regarded its relationship with the 
U.S. as mirror-like activity; the sense of existing in Asia was very weak. Even ten 
years ago, Japan was the big power in this region, but it still could not advance an 
efficacious economic policy, after the economic recession.  
Although the world economic focus has been on bringing transformation to East Asia, 
it is not easy to build a political community that because of diversity, besides U.S. 
interference. It is an important point that U.S. superpower plays a key role in Asia, but 
has challenged ASEAN’s proprietary role in ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) 
and Chinese diplomatic policy. The U.S. is not one of Asian countries, but one that is 
interfering. The U.S. did not hope that a political community would be built that may 
lose influence at East Asian countries. Japan selected and adopted a passive position 
that led to China as a rising potential economic and militarily superior power uniting 
East Asian power.  
After undergoing economic reforms, China actively sought a big power position in 
international society. Strengthening the relationship with neighboring states is the first 
policy. A rising China was also like an economic sponge sucking in foreign resources 
and finances. Japan was in economic recession, and meantime China was a new head 
of the geese. Furthermore, facing challenges of global order and the mighty influence 
of economic blocks, East Asian regionalization is not only outward regional 
organization, but also a process of Asian-izing, characterizing East Asia 
geographically and historically. 
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From major world tendencies, after the mid 1990s, the East Asian situation been 
changed substantially. The US introduced new “East-Asian strategies”, and the Russia 
stopped tending to the Western “Atlanticism” and moved to the “Anti-Westernism”. 
The attitude toward Russia share the ideology with non-Western countries. In addition, 
because of the bubble economy, Japan lost confidence, while China, since 1992, 
enjoyed economic development that attracted the world’s eyes. The West has 
chronically interfered in East Asia, yet eastern countries adopted straight 
independence and considered principles. With time, although East Asia was involved 
in Western forged affairs, East Asia started to strengthen relations among one another, 
forming a ring of multi-polar strategy. Especially China, aware of the world’s 
misgivings concerning “China’s threat”, evolved the “smile policy”. China’s 
neighboring policy was identified. Although, there are many versions of East Asian 
integration strategy, and as argued above, ASEAN is not strong enough to be a leader, 
but ASEAN as a center comes into view and China, Japan and Korea as sub-center. 
This pattern (Figure 3) was designed by China and ASEAN121. In addition, this pattern 
slots in India, New Zealand and Australia, the three related geographiccountries. It is 
initiative conception, this “loose” organization will slot in other related members.   
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Figure 3: The Pattern of East Asian Integration 
By: Author 
﹡Russia has applied for membership as a observer status on 2005. 
3.2 Asian-izing Integration 
East Asian integration is not yet very well developed, though it is deepening rapidly. 
East Asia still lacks some important content that is necessary for broad integration. 
Here, there are certain views of European and American experiences that are indeed 
available for East Asians pursuing this goal. In the first half of the 19th century the US 
economy was poorly integrated. Mountains, settlement gaps (empty geographical 
spaces bounded by “the frontier”), and a lack of navigable rivers kept markets quite 
separate from each other122. A sketch of the content of US market integration begins 
with a fragmented economy and the promising but ambiguous institutional framework 
of the Constitution. The US authorized states to maintain distinct regulations and 
improved technology and infrastructure accompanied the growth of cross-frontier and 
“national” trade. In mechanisms, this regional block emphasized pluralism. Open, 
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flexible democracy enables bargaining and policy response that redistribute these 
gains adequately enough to enlist the legitimate consent of most of the populace. The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ESCE), set up in 1952, gave birth to an 
institutional centralization. Until now, Europe appears as a single unity including 
political and economy aspects. The dominant view, in European integration, is 
pluralistic and liberal. Elaborate institutions were required to pay off the losers and to 
make credible long-term commitments to openness and cooperation123. The EU 
institutional framework was the result of a series of ancillary bargains that were 
politically necessary to satisfy interest-groups, market integration or to be better 
insulated by its effects-delivering side-payments and enhancing the credibility of 
policy cooperation124. In addition, the EU framework is a calculated mechanism to 
foment “ever deeper” regional market integration.   
American and European histories are mostly context-specific, unsuitable for 
comparison with each other. Yet their self-image as “the West” suggests the core 
content of an agenda for socially-embedded and regional integration. East Asian 
cooperation is different from EU and North American forms. In the globalization age, 
regional interests are expressly for providing the protection and enlargement of 
“public goods” among the members, frequently viewed as a kind of “collective 
power”. On one hand, it provides impetus to the balance of sharing interest globally; 
on the other, the members expect interests from the world redistribution by its 
integration. For these reasons, East-Asia has adopted “open cooperation”; the process 
aims at regime-making and interest-gaining. In terms of the historical and internal 
factors, East Asia has developed in a different way from that of the EU, to preserve 
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specialty regional interests. Facing inner differences and EU experience, the 
integrated pattern of East Asia adopted concentric circles and “loose” regionalism. On 
the one hand, strengthening economical power of “ASEAN+3” attracts other actors’ 
cooperation and increases negotiation capabilities. The economic base provides a prop 
for political and military power; however, in this age, mighty economic capability 
represents the pre-eminent political position.  
In the process of EU integration, the philosophy towards integration has reflected 
shifting attitudes among member nation authorities toward the efficacy of centralized 
supranational and state institutions for resolving pressing political, economic and 
social problems125, and East Asia has tried to be accordance with western order 
incorporated into characteristic Asian cultures. Pan-Asian culture and civilization are 
as real as the concept of pan-European culture and civilization126. Also, as Jacques 
Delors described European civilization 127 , authorities have also maintained the 
usefulness of common policies to establish cohesion. An instrument is not merely to 
promote economic development, but also to create a supranational social body. The 
process of East Asian integration would be able to maintain the culture identity of 
Asian civilization against the capitalist threats of North American and EU. 
By political fragmentations and external interference, the East Asian integration has 
tended to dominate each system within a hierarchical authoritarian political structure 
with a strong preference for maintenance of political stability and continuity. However, 
Institutional adoption to the “loose” and “openness” pattern of East Asian integration 
has alleviated political shock for differences in social systems. ASEAN, as an 
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administrative body, means that East Asian integration has been quite decentralized so 
as not to interfere with member nations’ desire for political independence128.  
3.3 Towards to a Community    
In reality, here has 200 million populations, occupy one-third in this world, GDP is 
about 7 trillion foreign exchange reserves reach half those of the world, and it is the 
biggest one of the three economic blocks. This holds infinite potential. Nowadays, 
East Asia is the most Cynosure in this world. The rising China, the second economic 
power Japan, and consolidated ASEAN have constituted a highflier market, leaving a 
notable fingerprint in the international pattern of the rising East-Asian area. In this 
process, the East-Asian economy is developing and integrating rapidly at the same 
time. Cooperation in the East-Asian arena is an expected tendency. 
East Asian countries have continued to follow an integrated approach in their attempts 
to stimulate their economies, and then increase cohesion in order to expand influence 
in the international society. Even though the road to catch-up may be very long, it is 
apparent that the new transformation of international society is emerging. East Asian 
integration is changing the Asian role from follower to stakeholder. The potential of 
East Asia is intrinsically unlimited. In 2007 leaders of ASEAN+3 will advance the 
blueprint of the ASEAN Charter to be like that of the EU and a political community. 
For population, the East Asian economic region will be the biggest free-trade area. 
For trade, it will be the third FTA following the EU and NAFTA. The East Asian 
arena is going to be a competitor in the international power structure. It signifies that 
East Asia’s role has changed from follower to a positive actor and balancer.  
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The changing role indicates changes to the rule of international interaction. There are 
abundant natural resources and rich sources of manpower with hard-working spirit in 
many of the economies of East Asia129. It attracts internal and external cooperation. 
America, Japan and China, the three powers, all want to reach the leadership position 
in the Asian arena that relates to power contention in international society. In the 
prospective future, East Asia will try to increase its “Asia-ness” and be free from the 
influence of US in policy-making. Japan possesses elemental economic power, but its 
Asian neighbors have challenged the ‘western-oriented’ foreign policy. By dint of 
rising economic and military power, China is standing up on the international stage. 
As stated above, anti-American (western) influence, related to the spirit of 
independence of Asian affairs, is deep-rooted in this region. A new East Asian spirit is 
emerging in an interactive structure.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. East Asia’s Perception    
4.1 Who is the Leader in East Asia? 
                                                 
129 Yu T-s.. “Can East Asia rise again?” Journal of Asian Economic vol.13. 2003. pp.725.  
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Power in reality, briefly, who get power? Who has influence? And, who is in 
leadership? Power politics in East Asia has always been an unavoidable contention 
about leadership. When East Asia integrates, it implies that the “leader” influences of 
the external superpower and East Asian trend. Here we would like to rearrange the 
concept of “who is the leader in East Asia” from above. 
In Robert Ross’ study, China has played a dominated position with influence on 
politics and economic, getting maximum interest when power vacuum for Soviet 
Union abdicate Vietnam and unite US didn’t make up for in time no matter in 
Northeast or Southeast Asia130. From political culture, China has emphasized a 
hegemonic position as diplomatic policy aimed to rebuild a might in Asia and expand 
in all the world finally. From economic, China has strong economic potential threaten 
Japan economic authority in East Asia, increasing fluctuant crisis in Asia-pacific131.  
Recently, China has been getting cauterization of politic and economic in Asia.    
Japan has faced China politic and economic challenge started to construct a political 
economic alliance in East Asian development. Doubtless, “U.S.-Japan Joint 
Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” is Japan core regional strategy 
in East Asia, improving diplomatic relation with China and political economic 
relation with ASEAN. Since 1990 Japan had the burst of economic bubbles declining 
dominated position had influence not only in East Asia and other regions. For 
reversing economic declining tendency, Japan has moved northeast Asian Economic 
Caucus, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and Japan-ASEAN free tread 
                                                 
130 Robert Ross. “The Geography of Peace-east Asia in the Twenty-first Century.” International Security , 1999. 
pp.83.  
131 Denny Roy. “Hegemony on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asia Security,” International Security, 1994 
pp.149-168. 
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arena or free trade agreements with other East Asian countries, through alliance 
strengthen influence in East Asia.   
China and Japan have intention to be a leadership in regional development, but 
intertangled conflict and regional steady both dedicate contended leadership to 
ASEAN. After Clod War, ASEAN has held more politic and economic counter than 
past. In politic, ASEAN has advanced leadership in regional affairs, ASEAN regional 
forum (ARF) is the mechanism dealing with East Asia security affairs; in addition, all 
Southeast countries joined in ASEAN which increasing importance in East Asia by 
unity. Likewise, ASEAN’s economy has developed swift giving them more 
confidence to manage regional affairs and increase the right to speak and determinate 
that independent on United States’ military protection, weaken United States’ power 
in Southeast Asia. ASEAN utilize ARF to control regional security affairs through 
inviting other superpower in region discussing political and economic issues that lead 
multilateral safe system in Southeast Asia132. This transformation not only symbolize 
increasing the right of ASEAN but manifest ASEAN desire to expand dialogs of 
regional security consolidating political influence. ASEAN has predominated over 
ARF and East Asian Summit to avoiding regional hegemonies and external 
interference hinder position of East Asia integration, withal ASEAN can be a role in 
power structure. In fact, as above, for avoiding conflict of power, ASEAN as a center 
and China, Japan and Korea as sub-center is a better way which an outcome of mutual 
respect for each other and peaceful coexistence. 
4.2 East Asian Attempts in the Geopolitical System and the International Order 
East Asian integration mainly aims at against west European and American regional 
                                                 
132 Rober Scalapino, 1995. “The US commitment to Asia,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 18. pp. 76. 
 89
blocks. Asia-pacific countries proceed bi-, multi-literal and multi-channel regional 
unite, seeking economic and political relative ascendancy those phenomenon is 
so-called “regional regionalism”. The most political-meaning is political economic 
integration of East Asia region emphasizing alliance of East Asianess exclude 
non-East Asia countries from region. In other words, it hope to exclude 
American-leading Western power from region, thus China and Japan can build 
association in East Asia region. Other East Asian countries also hope to unite in 
different economic and political level, dialogs with regional partner and advancing 
global influence by East Asian integration.   
Among regional economy would have certain competition and learning to build 
external interaction and inner consolidation of economic foundation. Emerging East 
Asian economic power lesson from power blocks could compete on equal terms with 
Europe and north America which could stand a new position in APEC and other 
international organization. In addition, by economic globalization East Asian 
countries took a broad view in world market and an overall arrangement in global 
governance to connect with world economy.      
In global co-governance, the importance of East Asia rising is obvious. Its distinct 
internal and external parts have, however, far outpaced their anticipations. They 
remain internally distinct; Higgott observed that there is no sense of community in a 
linguistic, religious, cultural, political or ideological sense nor is there much evidence 
of some form of regional consciousness133. Kahler even said that “Asia” does not 
represent a common culture. Differing perceptions and expectations arising from 
diverse political and economic systems and divergent economic performances 
                                                 
133 Higgott Richard. “APEC: A Skeptical View” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes 
in the Asia Pacific Region, Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.) (Allen and Unwin, 1994.). 
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between developed and developing members constrain institutional development in 
Asia134. Even so, East Asian governments show that a desire to sustain domestic 
political stability and national unity as well as an aspiration to reorient its international 
role toward an “Asian way” in East Asian integration and development135. As 
European integration was an economic instrument for solving a political problem, a 
common market to end the threat of war136, East Asia has emphasized the economic 
benefits; the political determination to end the threat of war made an important 
contribution to the success of the project. 
The evolution of East Asia’s interregional cooperation is also seen as part of wider 
ideological interflow. Extending internal diversity, East Asia has a characteristic 
foreign behavior, going from a follower to a facilitator, but not a leader. Facilitator 
implies that it keeps its characteristic through coordination and intercommunication 
continuously. All Asian countries in the early Post Cold-War period were more tied to 
the US than to each other. Deep mutual mistrust let to rather weak interactions. This is 
in line with expectations from the realist school of international relations: states 
mistrusting each other will prefer non-binding agreements, not putting all their “eggs 
in one basket”. This helps to explain the multitude of such weak, overlapping 
cooperation schemes in East Asia137. It also explains that East Asian countries feared 
“interference” in their own affairs. East Asia’s interregional cooperation emphasizes a 
greater flexibility and displays a greater willingness to enter into joint ventures with 
                                                 
134 Miles Kahler, “Institution-building in the Pacific” in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security 
Regimes in the Asia Pacific Region ,Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.) (Allen and Unwin, 1994). 
135 The idea of a distinct "Asian way" might have lost flavor in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. But the growth of 
a notion of an Asian identity no matter how loose has significance to the extent that other countries might feel 
obliged to define their policies vis-a-vis East and Southeast Asian countries in regionalist terms. John Lawrence 
Avila. “Regional Cooperation in APEC and ASEM: An Institutional Perspective.” A paper presented at the 1999 
Conference of APEC Study Centre Consortium. In Auckland, New Zealand. p.6. 
136 Erik Jones and Michael G. Plummer; EU-Asia: links and lessons. Journal of Asian Economics. Vol.14. 2004. 
pp.838. 
137 Steve Chan, “Liberalism, Realism, and Regional Trade: Differentiating APEC from E.U. and NAFTA,” Pacific 
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government in the face of market opportunities and change in East Asia than in 
European and North American contexts138.  
East Asian development facilitates the regional role of international society, especially 
if the “creation” of comparative advantage is stronger in the East Asian region than in 
Europe and North America. We cannot ignore that there are many obstacles facing 
East Asia that will need to be rapidly overcome. The financial system and 
management processes are important, but there are political confrontations within and 
between economies. From economic issues spilling-over to security issues the 
importance of this region increases for the other two blocks. Multi-issues is able to 
cope with the new era of economic liberalization and political globalization.        
5. Conclusions  
Power studying, via historic and multicultural perspectives, is the only way to 
overcome time-bound tunnel vision. In Michael Mann’s words: “Through historical 
comparisons, we can see that the most significant problems of our time are novel. 
That is why they are difficult to solve. They are interstitial to institutions that deal 
effectively with the more traditional problems for which they were set up139.” This 
history and unique culture gave modern international society the new interaction state. 
We will look at the future from the perspective of the past, to build a new process of 
power redistribution.  
This section puts emphasis on geopolitical, cultural and historical elements, as well as 
international political principles for interactions and to act as an extension to East Asia. 
The historically most significant consequence of the rise of new great powers is 
                                                 
138Richard Stubbs. “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3. 2002. 
pp. 440-455. 
139 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge University Press,1981) pp.6-8. 
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international political change140. East Asia is viewed as a rising great power, an 
emerging and integrating region, and the temptation is for other great powers to adopt 
new strategies. The basic argument is that growth in a nation’s population density and 
advances in technology generate demands for larger amounts and wider ranges of 
resources, which often cannot be met by the state’s domestic resource endowments141. 
Facing globalization, the nation-states find that they cannot deal with all these 
elements. Regions have now emerged as new places for the construction of policies, 
as systems of action, and as actors themselves in the global order142. 
A geopolitical-historical view of East Asia has been influenced by its earlier colonial 
relationship with Europe and the USA143. In terms of bipolarity, communalism led by 
western influences has taken notice of the circumstances of East Asia. From the “cold 
war” period, the U.S. has had alliances in East Asia. During the last decades, the 
world has gone through several major changes including the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’. The role of the region has brought dramatic 
developments in different spheres of political and economic interactions.  
East Asia’s role, however, has remained stable in the changing world order links to the 
strengthening relationships with North American and EU developing144. East Asia’s 
growth and economic experience, as well as those of Japan and China after 1949, 
exemplify the importance of historical legacy and the country-specific socioeconomic 
                                                 
140 Randall L. Schweller. “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The 
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144Jae-Seung Lee. “Talking Security in the APEC.” Presented for the APEC study center consortium 
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conditions within which unique principal institutions and their corresponding working 
rules are established; some countries (c.f. Japan and China) have borrowed and 
purchased Western technology freely, but have grafted this technology carefully onto 
their cultures without simultaneously adopting Western values145. However, it has an 
obvious developing process that borrows policy, technology and intellect from 
developed countries.  
East Asia’s rise may be due to the rearrangements made after economic recessions, 
but behind the inner economic integration and external cooperation there is deeper 
political competition (Figure 4: Coopetition in East Asia). We define the members and 
systems in this research, and discuss the cooperation-competition relationship among 
three actors and two sides. This section uses the cooperation between regional bodies 
as a research subject. The development in East Asia is the variable that leads to the 
competitions among cooperation organizations of regional bodies and results in the 
procedure of power realignment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 Angeresano James. “European Union Integration Lesson for ASEAN+3: The Importance of Contextual 
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Figure 4: Coopetition in East Asia 
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Appendix 1: Pacific Asia  
      
Source: Rumley, D. The Asia-Pacific and Global Geopolitical Change: definitions, 
issues and options, International Geographical Union Commission on the World 
Political Map.p.19 
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Appendix 2: The Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Source: Rumley, D. The Asia-Pacific and Global Geopolitical Change: definitions, 
issues and options, International Geographical Union Commission on the World 
Political Map.p.21. 
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Chapter 4: East Asian Strategy of North American and Europe 
1. Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss East Asian engagement with North American and 
Europe to be the foundation for the next chapter. From regional or actors geographical 
and historical factors, we learn that a rising power has intrinsic characteristic 
strategies for creating a calculated development pattern; in addition, the 
transformation of the international social order offers chances for new actors to enter 
the competition arena. In Chapter 3, East Asia’s rise is viewed as a major element to 
change system balance. East Asia’s rise has resulted from a changing global 
environment; likewise, it had a chance to take advantage of its potential economic 
power in the system. After the financial crisis, East Asia had to confront global 
competition with a “block” pattern in the system; in addition, the emerging cognition 
of common interest caused cooperation within the East Asian community.  
The EU and North America have regarded the rising East Asia as a major cooperator 
and agency of checks-and-balances. The vertical and horizontal alliance is not only 
for managing unknown development resulting from a rising East Asia. For the new 
challenges of globalization at the beginning of the 21st century states ask for effective 
international cooperation, while policy makers try to find new models with which to 
manage those new challenges. New problems are derived from new management 
mechanism, for example, which can permit actors to enter into the competition arena.  
In this chapter, we have analyzed different contexts of the two biggest interregional 
organizations. Beginning from East Asia’s influence, we move to analyzing other two 
regions’ attempts at cooperation, which will help us to explain the power-role gap and 
the analysis of interregional cooperation is examined to estimate possible pathways in 
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relation to the power structure of co-governance, both will be fundamental in any 
analysis of power realignment for next chapter.  
The power rising and decline is external challenge cause co-governance and change 
foreign policies. Europe and North American started to make other policies 
confronted the regional rising, formind triangle cooperation and coopetition. 
Potentially, it would be a competition, which is, taken in the third area.  
2. North American and Europe Incursion into East Asia Development 
2.1 Conception of East Asia’s Role in Geopolitical System 
United States has been regarded itself as establisher in East Asian order and securities. 
North American countries have been conducted by United States stepping in East 
Asian affairs and play an impeller for economic integration in East Asia. With East 
Asian integration, Western is exclusion from it that changing North American 
Conception of East Asia’s role. Firstly, the East Asia will become a collective political 
player in the region. It is destined to change as the regional political environment 
changes. Just as the end of the Cold War made it possible for the US during the last 
decade forward-deployed in Asia, East Asian integration appear the changing global 
situation. Through its network of bi- and multi-lateral relation, and thanks to the fact 
that relations among the East Asia build common view, it is able to exert considerable 
influence. 
In the current international situation, the US has dominated globalization. However, 
in May 2004, the EU’s enlargement added 10 countries to reach 25 members. The 
total population has reached 450 million, GDP has reached 9.2 trillion dollars, with 
the EU becoming the biggest world economic block. It has framed a European 
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economic-society model enacting EU constitution and challenging US      
leadership. The US was not about to let itself be outdone. The FTAA displaced 
NAFTA. NAFTA’s total population reached 360 million, and GDP reached 6.5 trillion 
dollar. After 2005, FTAA’s total population reached 800 million and GDP reached 13 
trillion dollars. 
Relying on pivotal geography, rich resources, enormous dimensionality, population, 
and transformation of international order, East Asia has already turned into an 
influential regional organization, and the colossal regional economic and political 
organization. Since the East Asian Community is established, the total population has 
reached 3.1 billion and GDP has reached 10.7 trillion dollars. Accordingly, the EU 
and North American cannot depart from this region. Interregional interaction becomes 
ever more important, complex, and arresting. For the intense economic reasons 
mentioned above, the EU and North America cannot neglect the emerging threat of 
East Asia. For EU, although the EU’s new strategy centers on economic issues, 
political and security issues have appeared on the ASEM agenda. Most Asian 
countries have strong security link with US, and, the US remain the key player in this 
region. Secondly, East Asia is a major economic player. It is the most important 
trading partner of EU and North American.  
The dynamic economic development in East Asia explains the increasing important 
role of this region in world trade and investment and its ever-increasing significance for 
Europe146. East Asia has recently surpassed NAFTA to become Europe’s main trading 
partner, accounting for a third of Europe’s total trade flows. Moreover, European FDI 
in East Asia amounts to a third of European investment abroad, and is growing.  
                                                 
146 Matthias Dembinsiki, Cooperation or conflict? : Transatlantic Relations in Transition, (New York : St. 
Martin's Press, 1998) pp. 183. 
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2.2 Strengthening the East Asia  
2.2.1 North American 
Are North American and European with the nations of East Asia likely to 
characterized by power politics, competition, or cooperation? The answer is with 
mixture of all of these. Competition remains unavoidable, especially but not 
exclusively in economic relations. The challenge for North American and the EU is to 
contain or manage their competition in order to minimize its impact on overall 
relation. The North American and the EU will remain committed to East 
Asia-politically, economically, and militarily-because it is in its vital regional interest 
to remain fully engaged in this vibrant region. It was North American and the EU vital 
interests that brought it to East Asia in the first place, and it is North American and the 
EU vital interest that will keep it fully engaged there in the future147.  
Politics-cooperation in Asia-pacific had stayed in forum (the foundation). Multilateral 
organization in North American –East Asia reflect North American’s viewpoint: no 
matter what kind of organization in Asia, which cannot arrive at European ability and 
cohesion, but it should be regards as a tools to avoiding breakup of current security 
system. However, North American who is exclusion and anxious about isolation from 
regional cooperation of East Asia, before APEC United States held “six-party 
talks”.148 Members include the most important countries in Asia tug regional security. 
From long-term, the political environment would change, especially alliance in 
Northeast Asia. Besides APEC Unite States held “six-party talks” to strain East Asian 
politics.  
                                                 
147 ibid. pp. 156-157. 
148 The Six-Party Talks concerning the DPRK’s nuclear program involve the United States, North Korea, China, 
Japan, Russia and, South Korea. involve the United States, North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and, South Korea. 
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U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick stressed that Regional free trade agreement 
have great political aim. Facing East Asia integration and anti-Americanness North 
American have to afforce APEC structure and purpose. 1.) The basic development of 
APEC will not change, but it could be part of alteration under mission statement, 
including encouragement of structure reform of members. 2.) APEC was established 
for promoting regional trade cooperation whose issues excess economics. On the one 
hand, it insist on “Bogor goal”-free open trade; on the other hand, it starts to facing 
some un-economic security issues, e.g.,. Human right, terrorism and the DPRK’s 
(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) nuclear crisis those challenge economic 
development and be brought into APEC program. 3.) APEC strengthen East Asian 
countries economic relation by as a single mechanism of trade and invest 
liberalization in Asia-pacific which still hard to replace.                 
2.2.2 Europe 
At 1994, EU announced “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, but after ten years, EU’s East 
Asian policy was limited by internal and international politics. Euro-Asia relation 
always based on real economic interest. Following eastern enlargement and terrorism 
EU got entangled in an unparalleled split. In addition, not having any direct 
security-interest in Asian region, the EU was looking for a role to play in the security 
arena. Again, one motive for this is the wish to offset at least to some degree the 
overwhelming presence of the USA both in Europe and in Asia149.  
Until 2005 EU started to respect East Asian affairs, the level of interdependence is now 
at unprecedented levels, and strengthening EU-Asia relations is thus one of the EU’s 
external policy priorities. The EU is consequently fostering dialogue and cooperation 
                                                 
149 Ifri, Europe-Asia: strengthening the informal dialogue, 3. 
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with all our Asian partner countries: 1.) after 911, atmosphere in the world economy 
drop to new low, only China and India high-speed development lead EU cannot but 
consider both emerging. 2.) EU strengthened its competitive ability by “Euro” in 
circulation and broaden and deepen to transform Central and Eastern Europe into 
modern. 3.) EU was getting lift spilt from China arms ban stands out coherence of 
common East Asian policy. In economic and trade policy, to meet the development 
challenges that lie ahead and further deepen EU-Asia relations, the European 
Commission has adopted 18 individual country strategies and a regional strategy, 
covering cooperation with Asia for the period 2007-2013, for which an amount of some 
€ 5.2 billion has been earmarked150. To further strengthen political and economic 
relations, regular summits take place with individual countries in the ASEM 
framework. Regular political and sectoral dialogues are vital so that we can 
constructively engage on issues of mutual interest. Furthermore, the European 
Commission is moving to negotiate Free Trade Agreements with South Korea, India 
and ASEAN, as well as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Asian partners.  
Economic and trade policy is the main shaft , but it is obvious towards to political, 
security, human right and environmental protection. Furthermore, the maintenance of 
peace and stability based on regional security-arrangement has a direct bearing on 
European companies who invest in Asian markets and are averse to any kind of risk. 
Closer economic relations between Europe and Asia therefore also have a security 
dimension151. The challenges are not only economic affairs, attract for EU interest, 
democratic and human right system, and threaten global sustainable development. 
After 2005, EU decided to build Asia-Europe free trade agreement before “Doha 
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Agenda”. In security, EU Commission detailed scholars and explores to comprehend 
Cross-Strait relations and DPRK’s nuclear crisis.  EU is different from American 
view make the most of poverty and inequalitysocial problems in developing countries, 
emphasizing domestic mosaic culture and international multi-regime those view will 
influence the region by EU’s East Asian policy.            
3. Supra-Regional Cooperation  
3.1 Comparison and Triangle Strategy  
Essentially, the process of APEC is like supra-regionalism, a structural attempt to 
combine a range of states within a coherent unified framework. Regardless of 
differences between regions or among members there is unity in a common 
organization. Under APEC, there are NATA (National Association of Testing 
Authorities), ASEAN and CER (Australian-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement) etc. with the motive of developing the liberalization of investment 
and trade. In contrast, inter-regionalism is a process of ASEM, explicitly setting one 
region in a dialogue (or potentially a conflict) with an ‘other’. The rhetoric of ‘equal 
partnership’ espoused at ASEM is quite different from the group of interests voiced 
within APEC. The idea of ASEM as a regional integrator, contributing to the building 
of an East Asian identity has been put forward or mentioned by several people. For 
instance, Hanns Maull and Akihito Tanaka at one Council for Asia-Europe 
Cooperation (CAEC) suggested that ‘ASEM could serve as a kind of regional 
integrator because it is a bilateral process between two regions, which requires a 
modicum of coordination on both sides’152.  
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Fundamental to an inter-regional engagement is the basic building bloc of identifying 
the ‘regions’ in question. In the unique framework of inter-regionalism, states to 
behave as if they were a region in the face of what they perceive to be a similar, 
definable, other. In the case of ASEM, the “Asian Ten” which did not then exist as 
such, met at least three times in the form of Asian Senior Officials Meetings (SOM), 
to decide on the format and agenda for the first ASEM Leaders Summit. All these 
meetings and consultations that took place prior to the inaugural meetings were 
consolidated and institutionalized after the Bangkok meeting153.  
The essence here is different, albeit the operation is similar. APEC and ASEM are 
both channels of dialogue between regions. For long-term operation, the meetings are 
assorted according to different issues and make changes according to the fluctuating 
situation. It aims to strengthen the relationship between regions, and build identity. In 
the other opinion, economical regime spill-over leads to political conflict and its 
attendant transformations; a common target stimulate a regional great power to 
employ absolute power in order to promote the relative power of collectivity in the 
system.  
Behind it, rational thinking and strategic choice show that cooperation is the important 
armaments for conflict with other power states or organizations. Facing globalization, 
regionalization is another form for handling new challenges; it can be a stumbling 
block or stepping stone. Regions-linkage reveals the changing relationship among 
Europe and the US the two existing powers, and the rising power, East Asia. With 
Japan’s economic recession, North America, the EU and East Asia regionalization a 
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“new Triad” replacing the US, Europe and Japan, the “old Triad”154. We can indicate 
this in Figure 5, Comparison between APEC and ASEM  
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Figure 5: Comparison between APEC and ASEM 
By: the Author  
In those three regions, Euro-Asia compares with American-Asia is flimsiness in which 
American-Asia has predominated over the Asian environment. However, ASEM’s 
enlargement implies that the relationship between East Asia and Europe is being 
strengthened. In a political-military regard, ASEM can aid Euro-Asia to build an 
equal-partnership strategic relationship and elevate the East Asian international 
position and influence. In addition, Europe got a foothold in Asia and that aided the 
EU to get an advantageous position to check and balance the US hegemony-caused 
multipolar structure of international power. ASEM should not stand for “Asian 
security, Europe missing”, but could be “ another major step in a strategy to shape a 
balance of power in the region in which the US will play a less dominant, though still 
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important, role”155. Even the most forceful advocates of a major security dimension in 
ASEM explicitly recognized the US as the predominant security provider in East 
Asia. ASEM’s security dimension would enhance the American perception of 
burden-sharing rather than free-riding156. Competition between Europe and the US to 
get benefits from East Asia cannot be denied. 
For both Asian and European governments the main purpose is economic. ASEM can 
aid Europe and Asia to communicate, reconcile disputes, open markets and administer 
multilateral market policy. According to international trade statistics 2006, North 
America was still the biggest trade partner for East Asia in 2005157；Compared with 
2003, it is obvious that in the value of interregional trade North America-Asia is in 
recession and Euro-Asia grows up158. The EU with non-Japan Asia had already been 
increasing faster than that of the US or Japan in the 1988-94 period. EU exporters 
surpassed those of the US, and were projected to far surpass those of the US in the 
early parts of the next century159.  
Regarding US opinion, American political and business elites would not find ASEM 
to be troubling. On political-military issues, the American desire for regional and 
global military stability could benefit from Euro-Asia validation and practical help. A 
similar opinion for security agenda, including trans-national crime, money-laundering, 
terrorism and trafficking in drugs can permit burden-sharing through ASEM 
agreement and cooperation. The economic issues are probably the most important for 
the US. As the US hoped, help from ASEM would certify American centrality in the 
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world economy by the ASEM investment Promotion Action Plan and Trade 
Facilitation Action Plan fitting the bill. It’s clear that the US was not alone in pressing 
for further Asian options in goods and services, stronger foreign investor protection, 
and willingness to use anti-dumping instruments. Even with US or North America still 
a leader in East Asia, China and the EU’s sweeping-partnership in ASEM, cannot be 
neglected if Euro- Asia continues to improve relations and reduce dependence on 
North America, above all, dollar unlinking. It will revise the tendency towards North 
America.    
3.2 Attempts of Interaction  
Realignment resulting from certain transformations of the power structure is probably 
due to the decline and rise of actor(s) in the system or an emerging power reaching for 
center stage. In Figure.4 of the last chapter, we presented evidence that globalization 
offers a chance for East Asia to shape an interregional cooperation and competition 
with North American and EU. Stretching the conception of the last chapter, I try to 
re-order the attempts at interaction by the three actors and two interregional 
organizations, as in Table 1. After WWI, international society began paying close 
attention to finding ways to create a peaceful world. Churchill considered that 
regional organizations could promote world peace. Afterwards, the Cold-War period, 
the UN’s peace-keeping and globalization were not accomplished; at the same time, 
Europe reconstructed in a rapid process through which we discovered that the 
development and existence of states needs cooperation with other states. In the 
transformation of international order, we could suppose a region as a single actor 
would want to utilize “spill-over” to communicate experiences, ideas, policies and 
capabilities to solve discrepancies and draw a beneficial framework.    
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Table 1: Attempts of Interactions among East Asia, EU and North American 
East Asia  EU  North American  
1. Asian aspiration 1. toward a world key role 1.retain existing benefit (retain 
leadership) 
2. cooperation on security and 
economic issues  
2. Near East－Far East  2. manage rising power  
3. multilateral regime and 
partner(self-determined operation) 
3. check and balance for APEC 3. security issues (anti- terrorism) 
4. role-reorientation    
 
 
Manageable international order 
 
By: the Author 
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3.2.1 EU’s Attempts 
In the post-Cold War world, Europe is attempting to come back to East Asia on a large 
scale. The Commission first set out an overall framework for EC relations with Asian 
countries in its 1994 Communication “Towards a New Asia Strategy”. The present 
Communication updates that strategy, taking account of key developments in the 
intervening years, and establishing a comprehensive strategic framework for our 
relations with Asia and its sub-regions in the coming decade. It was a first effort to 
take an integrated and balanced view of the relations between the EU and its Asian 
partners. Much of this is still broadly valid, but at the same time much has changed in 
both regions since then160.  
Unlike APEC, ASEM explicitly has included a political and security dimension from 
the beginning, thus enabling members in principle to bring up security issues161. 
ASEM agenda is the reform of the United Nations (UN).The representatives of ASEM 
partners, reflecting various cultural, religious, and faith heritages, gathered in Nanjing, 
China on June 2007 at the Third ASEM Interfaith Dialogue162, to reinforce the 
multilateral system and promote an Asia-Europe dialogue on key-issues. It is observed 
that East Asia’s rising is important for Europe, yet it is also observed that Europe 
values security in new Asian strategy. In 2002, the ASEM Copenhagen Declaration on 
Cooperation against International Terrorism and the ASEM Copenhagen Cooperation 
Programme on “Fighting International Terrorism,” were adopted. In addition, in 2005 
the Commission of the European Communities put out a “Strategy Paper and 
                                                 
160 Commission of the European Communities. Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships. COM (2001) 469 final. Brussels, 4.9.2001 
161 H.W. Maull, N. Okfen.. Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC .Asia Europe Journal. 
Vol. 1(2). 2003. P.243. 
162 Commission of the European Communities. Nanjing statement on interfaith Dailogue- Third ASEM interfaith 
Dailogue. 19-21.Juni. 2007. .
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Indicative Programme or Multi-Country Programmes in Asia” emphasizing the 
importance of environment security which plays a main position in the ASEM Trust 
Fund. Resulting from the EU’s “Enlargement”, the European Commission published a 
report on progress, together with recommendations about how the policy could be 
further strengthened. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) not only 
strengthened the economy and politics, but also the civil society dimension163. In 
acknowledging that diversity, the EU would set one clear core objective to guide the 
future development from East Europe to central Asia, and in the future, far Asia. The 
EU has moved from a strategy based on ‘aid and trade’ towards recognition of the 
importance of a fast developing Asia for the EU. The new strategy encompasses and 
strikes a better balance between the economic, political, social and cultural 
elements164.    
From the analysis of European attempts mentioned above and Chapter 3, we have 
good reason to thinking that while broadening the eastern scope, Europe has 
strengthened not only intrinsic regional dominion, but crossing the borderlines of 
neighbors through co-governance from central Asia to far Asia, whereupon it was 
observed that we can find Europeans participating in East Asian issues, such as the 
Korean Peninsula and East Asian integration. This is a manifestation of the ambition 
of Europe to play a key role in international relations. 
 
                                                 
163 See, Commission of the European Communities. (2006).Communication from The Commission to the Council 
and The European Parliament arliament on Strengthening The European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels, 4 
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4 December 2006 
164 Communication from The Commission (2001).Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
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3.2.2 North America’s Attempts 
Preponderance in economic power and military might are certainly characteristics of 
American leadership. The US currently enjoys a well-balanced, clearly dominant 
international political role, associated with an ascription of leadership by many of its 
strongest allies. As APEC’s eminent Person Group Report noted, “the US, the 
traditional leader of the global trading system, may be going regional or at least 
hedging its bets”165. APEC’s institution is also seen as part of the wilder “ideas battle” 
between Asians and North Americans concerning varieties of capitalism. In East 
Asian integration, North American/ US leading power is the first challenge. East Asia 
is moving towards to an “Asian-izing” path, obeying a self-determined policy, but an 
American preference is for a state-centered power-based approach to economic 
relations rather than a rules-based system so important to smaller states in the 
international economy, that is different from the cooperation approach of EU.     
US role and power result in part from the misalignment in other countries, especially 
Germany, Japan and China. The most significant systemic changes in international 
political roles over the next 20 years will involve regional cooperation- EU and 
emerging East Asia, increasing interregional interaction. Those developments could 
diminish the US’s international political role. After 1993 North America had made the 
most of the economic growth potential from the “goose-model” and strategic value of 
East Asia was counterpoised with that of the EU, giving an active impetus to APEC. It 
made use of the “claw-policy” to check-and-balance the EU. It revealed that retain 
leadership attempt. For North American policy, ASEAN countries had not dared to go 
against North American (especially the US) leadership, because their exports 
                                                 
165 APEC. A Vision for APEC: Towards an Asia Pacific Economic Community, Report of the Eminent Persons 
Group to APEC Ministers, Singapore: APEC Secretariat. 1993.    
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depended on the North American market.  
After the 9.11 terrorist attacks, one of the most visible changes in recent years was the 
diminishing salience of economic and trade issues in APEC while non-economic 
issues, especially security issues, were getting more attention. APEC Agenda is at the 
crossroads of enlargement and concentration. The rise of non-traditional security 
issues has been evident in recent years. Economic security and human security were 
getting more attention, especially in the aftermath of 9.11 terrorist attacks.166 . 
Geopolitical security issues had an explicit section in APEC’s official communiqués.  
In summation, North America is always the stakeholder in the process of East Asian 
development; keeping its leadership and balancing the emerging power seem to be its 
cardinal goals. In addition, there are indications that some APEC member 
governments did indeed seek to use interregional cooperation to “check and balance” 
other players, to promote national and regional stability and prosperity, and to foster 
the formation of regional collective identities167. 
4. Conclusion-Potential for Future  
Facing East Asia integration causing new order, APEC and ASEM include 
corresponding powerful East Asian countries those influence political, economic and 
social cooperation and negotiations. Nevertheless, APEC and ASEM, one is 
transregion and another is interregion, still insist on some functions or adjusts some 
acts.     
                                                 
166Jae-Seung Lee .Talking Security in the APEC. presented at the APEC Study Center Consortium Conference / 
PECC Trade Forum, Korea. 23 May 2005. 
167 H.W. Maull, N. Okfen.. “Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC.” Asia Europe Journal. 
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z APEC  
1.APEC already towards to multilateral cooperation regime of economy and trade, it 
seems that APEC become discussed regime for economic and relative security issues, 
its function and importance extending security issue is the vital policy. APEC is a 
platform for Asia-pacific countries to Counseling and cooperation. 
2. APEC is unavoidable faces structure strain by extending regional issues. How to 
advancing policy benefits management is the rooted reasons to reform.   
3. APEC is a multilateral cooperation regime advancing from coast-to-coast, but new 
regional development will promote APEC transformation or consolidation, even 
weaken those have to observe carefully.   
z ASEM  
ASEM is a political forum between Asia and Europe, aim to political dialogue, 
economic cooperation and social-culture connection to promote trust and 
comprehensive partner. The EU is working for the removal of internal Asian barriers- 
such as legal, administrative or policy practices-that put a damper on foreign policy. 
ASEM provided a tradition forum in which an economic dialogue on reducing Asia’s 
barriers could be conducted; the European commission had to rely solely on its 
economic diplomacy with East Asian countries. Some Asian representatives urged the 
EU to increase its involvement in security issues to demonstrate to the US that “its 
role and functions can potentially be taken over by another willing and able player, 
namly,Europe.”168   
                                                 
168 Singh. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEAM): A Search for a new Order or Balance of Power? pp. 10. 
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While ASEM has been identified by some as a potential source of EU-north American 
tension, it also has many positive aspect. To the extent that these issues remain on the 
ASEM agenda and on the agenda of the various EU states individually, it helps to 
send a coordinated message and keeps up the pressure on Asian states to reform. It 
also takes some heat off North American. 
In sum, both APEC and ASEM built a regime and common norms under which 
individual countries can self-making and seeking self-interest. In addition, economic 
unities share information through regional cooperation. Regional policy dialogues and 
supervisal mechanism benefit for interconnection. 
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Chapter 5: Creating a Balance  
1. Introduction 
Globalization stimulates regionalization, through regional alliance advancing 
ascendancy in global system. Trisection in global economic dominion, NAFTA, EU 
and East Asia community, also form world political trigonometry. In triangle politics, 
North American and Europe influenced the East Asia political economy through 
APEC and ASEM; furthermore, depending on economic ability of NAFTA and EU 
maintain political and economic interest when East Asia integration169.  
In fact, likely Euro symbolize a political willing only strengthening European 
integration could enhance speaking right in the world and reducing American 
influence, East Asia through “ASEAN+3 Summit” as core hold “East Asia summit” to 
plain “East Asian community” cohere “East Asianess” not only economic relation, but 
also diplomatic relations in Asia-Europe and in Asia-North American170.  
2. The Power Structure of Co-governance  
Before we come to power realignment among East Asia, Europe and North America, 
one more point of the power structure of co-governance must be clarified that will 
help us to arrange possible paths of power realignment. In the preceding chapter, I 
pointed out that the attempt by the global triad for pre-eminent international roles and 
power, as well as the strategies chosen by existing power regarding a rising power. 
For reasons mentioned above, the cooperation and conflict among the three regions 
                                                 
169 Peter Drysdale and David Vines, eds., Europe, East Asia and APEC: A Shared Global Agenda? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), part I, pp. 1-70. 
170 Nuraina Abdul Samad, “Strong Asia-Europe Bond Relevant in World Today,” New Straits Press, October 21, 
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possess such behavior from geographically, culture and history. In cooperation with 
East Asia, North America has affected Asia deeply; and Europe as a collective power, 
has tried to check-and-balance North America by being up-and-coming in 
international society. A changeful international order is not, as in past, only manifested 
through real conflict. New governance rules have been increasing the variability of 
power realignment. In accordance with power realignment, we must understand the 
power structure of co-governance in the global order. 
2.1 Global Governance without Government 
Rosenau described global societal order as “governance without government”, 
exploiting two meanings: the first, it is characterized by multiple centers of authority 
and influence. The process of governance cannot be understood simply as a function 
of state action. In globalization, actors engaged in a continuing attempt to maintain or 
encourage order in terms of multi-subjects, regime and issues. The second is 
fragmentation of the international order. Hollingsworth and Boyer suggested the 
“social system of production” and Rhodes argued about “differentiated polity”; both 
show that functional and institutional specialization and the fragmentation of policies 
and politics171. In addition, Governance has, in the “analytical” sense, the merit of 
providing a conceptual framework within which diverse forms of political and 
economic organization can be compared and contrasted172. Theoretical knowledge of 
systems of governance developments have examined institutional structures, their 
effectiveness and failures, and prescribed various ways of ameliorating the problems 
                                                 
171 R. A. W. Rhodes, Understanding Govenance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. 
(Buckingham: Open University Press.1997). JR Hollingsworth, R Boyer.1997. “Coordination of Economic Actors 
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172Mark Beeson, “Globalization, Governance, and the Political-Economy of Public Policy Reform in East Asia,” 
Governance, 14(4), 2001. pp. 487. 
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of collective action that international affairs pose. 
From an “institutionalism” perspective, APEC and ASEM are potentially important 
contributors to enhanced international cooperation and “global governance”. Both 
APEC and ASEM have indeed tried to make such contributions, notably with regard 
to the international trading order 173 . APEC’s programmatic concept of “open 
regionalism” was presented, by its promoters, as an important addition to the existing 
international trading order. “Open regionalism” was said to advance global trade 
negotiations more rapidly and ensure a more effective implementation of WTO 
agreements on a non-discriminatory basis174. However, APEC’s operation was too 
cumbersome and too slow. In the fact, APEC has little contributed in any significant 
way to effective global governance, but it has advanced cooperation structure. 
ASEM, too, presented itself as an element in a system of “global governance”175, that 
is, as part of the multitude of formal and informal arrangements through which states 
and/or non-state actors cooperate and settle common problems. The agenda of the 
ASEM process includes many of the core challenges to global governance, such as the 
implications of migration, environmental destruction or international terrorism. From 
its inception, ASEM has also tried to involve business and civil society in its dialogue 
programs. In terms of the substance of the ASEM agenda, but also because of its 
road-based, open, democratic and informal procedures and its strong emphasis on 
dialogue and mutual understanding, ASEM seemed well-placed to fit the model of 
global governance through public-private policy networks as a complement to 
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traditional ways of tackling the challenges of globalization176. 
Power structure in “without government” of the international order may account for 
leadership competition existing always, but the way is different. To know the pattern 
of power competition is to know possible ways of power operation. Therefore, we 
must be clear about the structure of interaction. The relations among the system and 
actors are composed of material and cognitive structures. Material structure includes 
rules, institutions “affecting” and common standards; cognitive structure is cognition 
extending from ideology and beliefs. A system facing balance or troubles must 
understand the role and power of actors’ by their attempts, and whether material and 
cognitive structures can operate in coordination.  
2.2 Material Structure  
The material structure of governance like cognitive structures comes from the 
individual history, culture and geographic characteristics and so on. But the material 
structure explanation is the systematic concrete attribute. The system in the process of 
transformation, if it does not encounter war or large scale collapse, usually changes 
gradually. The unstable security (contains economic and political complex security) 
lets the actors unceasingly carry on the balance in not an unwritten rule search. We 
may delineate the power structure of co-governance as in Table 2.  
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Table 2:  Power Structure of Co-Governance 
  Model  
System  existing ascendance  
Power  asymmetry  
Value tools 
Fact Multilateral governance /regime/ security 
Cooperation pattern  competition /dialogue  
Cooperating issues plurality 
Addition  Regional cohesion /civil society  
                   By: the Author 
The system is consecutive and relative; a power rising implies that power must be 
shared. In the past, political power gained from violence showed ascendancy in 
international society, but it was uncertain and generally illegal. For steady political 
power and gaining identification from large public hegemony through the 
establishment of a set of laws and rules to confirm and protect its role and power, are 
required. This set of laws and rules restricts the operation of political power; if 
disobeyed, its members can turn against the leader. However, it still cannot eliminate 
superiority within the system. In the cooperation among three regions, although the 
operating framework and even institutions are loose, disobeying the rules entails 
losing an advantageous position. There is an existing ascendance in system; it means 
that power relation is asymmetrical, which leads the weaker tries to seek balance. As 
EU cooperation with East Asia, this intention certainly lurked behind the frequently 
presented view that ASEM represented a response to a fundamental imbalance in the 
triangular relationship between three majors regions: ASEM was to answer the 
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perceived “shift in US policy towards Asia”177. 
The value of interregional cooperation is its use as a tool, for East Asia fitting in with 
the “West” orderly integration within diversity. Furthermore, it is also for EU and 
North America to drive rising East Asia to correct its development to avoiding 
divergence. The EU and North American regional cooperation held a lesson for East 
Asian countries to communicate with each other and form common values, when their 
misery derives from obeying several policies from the process of collectivization. The 
common value shows a massed pressure changing regulatory and harmonious ability 
in regional cooperation. The rising collective power make given powers reduce 
political cooperation, so that given powers will seek a propitious regime and 
governance model for advancing cooperative density among members, that raise East 
Asia’s role and achieves an objective of balance in- or visibly. 
Most East Asia countries were dependent on North American aid from which they got 
benefits. Under globalization, North America has confronted the challenges, economic 
and military from the emerged Europe. Entering the 21st century, the emerging East 
Asia is re-challenging North America and Europe. Compared with past relations of 
competition and independence, the complexes in East Asia with the existing power 
calculate the path to be more difficult. In addition, East Asia is conscious of 
increasing power namely increasing bargaining power from a rising power’s challenge 
to exist. 
A political system must have high legitimacy to reduce the cost of governance 
advancing efficiency, stabilizing political situations and avoiding crises. From the 
mid-1980s onwards, under the impact of a “New Regionalism“, there has been a 
                                                 
177 Cf. European commission: Towards a New Asia Strategy, com (94) 314 final, Brussels, 13.07.1994. 
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proliferation of regional organizations which now extend far beyond the confines of 
the Triad which had previously been the core of international institution-building178. 
As Rüland argued, differentiation of international institutions is taking two directions; 
it proceeds laterally through regime formation in narrowly defined issue areas and 
vertically through a multilayered institutional system ranging from global multilateral 
forums down to the conventional bilateral state-to-state relationships 179 . In 
interregional cooperation, three regions based on different cooperation relations have 
different institutional characteristics. Yet on the different paths, all show multilateral 
regime and agenda-setting. Therefore, we can say that governance efficiency in 
globalization has to consider distinct political culture; a multilateral regime seems a 
useful approach.    
For real cooperation status, regimes be set for practicable governance; security is not 
only a traditional concept. Multilateral security includes economic, social and cultural 
conceptions, and is the kind of “soft” security. At the beginning of ASEM, the issues 
didn’t only include economic ones. By contrast, the economy was a key issue in 
APEC, yet APEC incorporated the military issue following terrorist threats and the 
North Korea security issue, e.g., it held a series of “APEC Leaders' Statement on 
Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth and North Korea”. 
In its model of operation and scope of work, ASEM has mimicked APEC180. 
Institutional structure and mechanisms in ASEM have been followed by APEC. 
However, ASEM adopted a model of coordination, while APEC is an embedded 
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model. Cooperation and regime formation also proceed due to strategic reasons. Both 
forums were attempts at engaging major powers in an institutional framework as well 
as to manage inter-state relations. Although patterns of cooperation are different, the 
competition among the three regions has always existed. ASEM always said: this was 
more hope than reality, and disliked the fact that APEC had fundamental 
institutionalization, yet both used dialogue to reconcile disputes from competition. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3 and chapter 4, every region attempts to obtain what it wants. 
In terms of regional benefits, regions cannot be stand-alone islands in an 
interdependent international order; nothing but entering the control center can provide 
power. In the world order, establishing a manageable international environment and 
avoiding big-clashes are front burner issues.  
2.3 Cognitive Structure    
In the international system, a harmonious structure is a normal phenomenon involving 
relative power among actors and explaining the rules of power realignment. Cognitive 
structure is involved in political culture (common knowledge). Meaning needs to be 
conferred via a harmonious cognitive structure. Actors’ common concepts are 
obtained through interactions. The international system’s culture is a common concept 
to be distributed in international society, to form a cognitive structure of international 
society. Particular cognitive structures afford particular implication for a harmonious 
structure.  
In interregional interactions, cognitive structure seems to be viewed as an ideological 
power playing a dominant role during the rise of the world regions. It is different from 
military and political power. According to Mann, this kind of power includes 
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“territorial centralization” and “geographical diplomacy” 181 . He argues that 
geographical diplomacy was the main organizing factor in forming integrative Europe. 
Geography is deeply interconnected with other dimensions of social relations: culture, 
economics, politics, psychology, and time182. Regional integration and competition 
offers regions a strengthened concept of increasing bargaining power, and not only in 
government. Civic society is like a mediator linking interregional governance. Telò 
advanced that the EU as a civilian power is a long-term trend, and epoch-making in 
the development of the international identity. In addition, the increasing civilian 
power of the EU reduces the soft power of the US 183 . Civilian power is a 
characteristic loop through structure specialty and culture represents that regional 
absolute cultural hegemony. My contention similar to Telò’s civilian power of the EU, 
East Asia as a new evolving international actor needs to assert itself by focusing on 
and promoting its own particular priorities and interests. Multilateral interaction has 
proved East Asia is a collective, civilian power increasingly evolving a system of 
values, ideology, and planning. Civil society in Western emphasizes “individual” civil 
virtue, which coheres through circulation of organization and institution, and then 
forms a specific political process. Civil society in Western also provides a mechanism 
to answer quick transformation of globalization readily. Furthermore, it is a part of 
governance to cushion external stimulation through civil learning. Compare with 
Western, there is different developed model in East Asia. In Northeast Asia, 
Confucian has influenced the development of civil society that formed a governance 
model and influenced political development, yet it is not a definite system. In 
Southeast Asia, civil society has been affected by divergent culture. It requires proper 
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accommodation to set up a transnational civil society. In fact, civil society is, whether 
in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia, a network of interconnection that builds a 
common consciousness to respond globalization. 
In supraregional competition, each region has its distinctive culture and ideology. It is 
obvious that regions embellish rationality and justice by exporting ideology /soft 
power/civilian power, because actors will learn from other embedded concepts to 
distribute public interests equally, while avoiding free-rides. This opportunism proved 
that actors’ power enhance and assist its value. 
3. Possible Path of Power Realignment 
From the chapter 3 and chapter 4, we know that the three regions attempt to increase 
interregional interactions, and in this chapter, we analyzed the power structure of 
co-governance. This section from the gap we will try to analyze the possible paths of 
powers realignment. According to the above treatment, presuming East Asia has a 
single voice to base itself in the world, like the EU and North America, as a single 
entity, it can be in place to fulfill this obligation of “speaking with one voice.” 
Different institutional rules, for decision-making and for delegating negotiation, 
reveal different capabilities. Fundamental regional flaws and existing international 
roles generate inter-regional conferences and communication for gaining power and 
maintaining interests. Actors will calculate a rising power’s danger and figure out how 
to respond and how much can get from the rising power; the absolute interests and 
relative losses affect the replying policy. In this section, we enter into the issue of 
possible pathways among the three regions and the response of existing regions. 
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3.1 Power-Role Gap  
First, the power-role gap was explained in Chapter 2 to be the most important 
motivation for actors changing their behavior and policy, which leads them to devise 
or adjust original policies. As in the above discussion, we roughly explained the 
integration of East Asia and supra-regional interaction. Here we expand on the 
divergence among the three regions, within the East Asia transformation. Making a 
classification of power and role, we must attend to ascribed and operational power 
and role. Ascribed power and role correspond to reputation, and to what other actors 
believe, regarding an actor’s capability, position and status. Operational power and 
role are the announced aim, scope and focus of the state’s foreign policy. The 
credibility of these role estimations, in turn, is based on operational power. Moreover, 
we explore supra-regional cooperation. The gap in our scheme is the argument that 
integration leads to increased wealth and power, and that this will permit East Asia to 
reflect its role and power, and altering their preference structures so that violent 
conflict is no longer a desirable option.  
East Asia’s ascribed power is obviously dependent on the desire of the conflicting 
parties to cooperate with East Asia. The process of cooperation with East Asia is full 
of carrots and sticks, compelling actors through the mechanisms of integration and 
association to change their policies vis-à-vis the other party with conciliatory moves, 
rather than by deepening securitization184. The carrot of East Asia involves its 
economic interest. In patterns of negotiation, as well as by setting conditions for the 
opening of pattern negotiation, East Asia is setting up its legal and normative 
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framework185. In this interdependent international relation, East Asia emerges as a 
formidable economic power with political potential. By contrast, perhaps East Asia’s 
potential economic and politic power reveal elemental influences, yet actors always 
respond to change by making decisions after event has happened. Europe and North 
America must calculate possible pathways of East Asia’s development to avoid any 
unmanageable situation, or losing theirs predominance.  
Ascribed role relies on the actor’s image to other actors in system. East Asian growth 
changes the equilibrium for ascribed roles. East Asia has started to participate in the 
competition in the system. In addressing economic issues, the comparative advantages 
attract foreign investment, and greater competition supports the principles of 
competitiveness and complementation, the elements of productive interaction that 
shape the changing of the structure of the system. In conflict situations, East Asia has 
evolved from follower to competitor. North America and the EU link their political 
agendas with East Asia and, through references to cooperation, justify de-securitizing 
moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate186. As mentioned 
above, East Asia was evaluated as an emerging power; moreover, it was an agency of 
check-and-balance between the EU and North America. Cooperation with East Asia is 
not only for increasing benefits and controlling this rising power, but for maintaining 
a leadership role in the system.        
An operational role is the subject’s desire; in other words, it is the express goal of 
foreign policy. It is supported by contact between conflicting and cooperating actors, 
mainly through direct common activities. Sustained contact within the context of 
                                                 
185 The framework of negotiation was controlled by developed countries and has observed capitalist roader. East 
Asian changes the rule visibly and invisibly. It exhibited that, as hegemonism, world order always string along 
with possession of power of actors. 
186 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde.. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, (Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner 1998) 
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common projects may however lead to a broader societal effect in the form of social 
networks through competition, which in turn should facilitate identity change as 
foreseen within the constructive policy of objective actors. With East Asian 
cooperation, the cooperative program provides funding for such cross－continent 
cooperation to promote common interests. East Asia through multilateral 
co-governance, regimes, and issues, promotes its importance. Furthermore, the 
dilemma between the EU and North America offers East Asia a chance to re-orient its 
role as follower.    
Operational power is the direct activities of foreign policy. East Asian productivity 
growth is a kind of operational power. In the economy, productivity growth is 
essentially the outcome of allowing markets to operate freely to the fullest possible 
extent; hence the call for rapid domestic liberalization and full integration with the 
world economy187. Economic growth (operational power rising) attracts other regions’ 
cooperation. It represents that interest would be shared in East Asia market. The 
sharing of interests involving a series of negotiations and bargaining positions, will 
lead to conflict resolution for a certainty. Globalization causes an interdependent 
international society, but also interactions with regional characteristics. The East Asia 
characteristic emerges, as European “rule” and North American “hegemony,” a 
“self-determined” political culture.  
Interest has been a traditional concern of international relations theory, which also 
means power possession. Power tells us how much influence an actor can be expected 
to have over others; interests tell us how and for what purposes that influence will be 
used. To get to the bottom of an affair, three blocks’ compete for a manageable 
                                                 
187 Sachs, J. and A. Warner, “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, No. 1. (1995). 
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international order, besides self-interest. From a risk-management perspective, we 
learn how two existing regional blocks manage a rising block. As stated above, we 
make the exploration of the rising East Asian impact and the power-role gap among 
the three regions in the system. East Asian is an integrating cause variation in the 
power-role equilibrium of system. System equilibrium expresses, in other words, the 
changes of system structure. The emergence of a second great power transforms a 
unipolar system into a bipolar one; the rise of a third great power transforms a bipolar 
system into a tripolar one. In our case, this is important because the system dynamics 
(or characteristic behaviors) of unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar structures 
differ significantly from each other.188 Great power transformation in the political 
economic system means changing the rations of sharing interests as well. Facing the 
transformation of the system, the existing power calculates absolute and relative 
interest changes and designs plans in reaction. The rising power threatening existing 
power could possibly cause conflict, while cooperation leads the existing power to 
reduce the cost of conflict and increase the information. Therefore, conflict and 
cooperation is one coin with two sides.  
The East Asian market has the rising explosive force of an emerging market, 
especially in ASEAN, and the bi-motored induction: China and India, so hot money 
turn around in the region, every area grows rapidly, causing foreign capital to enter 
ceaselessly. In 2005, East Asian growth surmounted the average of the world and 
more than OECD, broadly speaking. A rising East Asia ineluctably shares the interest 
allocation of the world. According to Classical Realism, a nation's interests are shaped 
in the first place by its power (measured in terms of material resources and political 
                                                 
188 Randall L. Schweller “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory” in Engaging China: The 
Management of an Emerging Power, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross. ( London ; New 
York : Routledge, 1999) 
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influence). Specifically, as Martin Wight stated: “It is the nature of powers to expand. 
The energies of their members radiate culturally, economically and politically, and 
unless there are strong obstacles, these tendencies will be summed up in territorial 
growth.”189  
In this view, actors expand when they can; that is, when they perceive relative 
increases in state power 190and when changes in the relative costs and benefits of 
expansion make it profitable for them to do so. Thus, Gilpin wrote: “a state will 
attempt to change the international system only if it has some relative advantage over 
other states, that is, if the balance of power in the system is to its advantage.”191    
The EU and North America have become aware of the relative advantages changing in 
the international system; however, the question of how to manage a rising power 
presupposes that such a situation is dangerous and therefore requires a strategy or plan 
of action on the part of he established powers. North America has been involved in 
Asia for a long time as a leader role. It has always allied itself with fellow states 
(Japan, Korea and Taiwan) to enhance its influence, especially Japan. It hopes that 
Japan can maintain the strong economic power which, with US military power, can 
overbear Asia- Pacific. The EU and Asia have close trade relation, the import and 
export value to Asia being almost a quarter of it all. From 2000 to 2005, EU and East 
Asian volume of trade (especially China) grew twofold; the EU has become the 
biggest export market for some East Asian countries. The EU thinks that it is time to 
                                                 
189 Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad and Martin Wight, Power Politics, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), 
pp. 144. 
190  Fareed R. Zakaria makes an important and often overlooked distinction between national and state power: 
"Power, for the statesman, must be 'usable' and hence involves not the nation's power but instead the national 
government's power or 'state power.' The latter can be defined as the central government's ability to extract 
resources from society and the ease with which central decision-makers can implement their preferences."  
Fareed R. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 7. 
191 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). pp. 54. 
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open its market and advance the development of the export-economy in East Asian 
countries; the EU certainly gets interest from it.       
Ostensibly, we believe that actors in the world remember history, war experience and 
peaceful interaction. However, rapid growth requires external expansion to sustain 
itself; thus, the expansion of powers is the product not only of internal pressure but 
also of threats and opportunities in the external environment. The EU and North 
American base their interactions with East Asia on history and experience but now EU 
and North American argue if the integration of East Asia is dangerous or not via serial 
knowledge process. With transferability of types of knowledge in codified data actors 
can easily comprehend and deal with structural shifts; on the contrary, considering 
ideology or an anthropogenic source (philosophy and though), it will be more difficult 
to deal with a contingency.    
In general, policy-making and strategic plans involve the collection of data, inner 
belief and calculation of mutational probability. We analyze power-role, with which it 
is not difficult to assimilate other actors’ ascribed power, but operational power 
includes potential power which is calculated not only by statistics but also by inertial 
behavior (philosophical thinking) and bombshell forecasts. Externally, the EU and 
North America cooperate with East Asia by bi- or multilateralism and inter-regional 
organization. It is the integration of East Asia that is driving the new wave of 
economic development from which EU and North America profit; yet it can still be 
viewed as a conflict in the world. In the international social system, some powerful 
nations of the integration of East Asia generate new crises. For example, China’s 
getting strong let other East Asian countries change the leader, Japan to China 
although China is a developing country and Japan is a developed country, China has 
transcendental economic development and seeks to build up and legitimatize its rule. 
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The EU has expanded the Chinese market, for example, till June 2004, the EU 
increased export figures of service industry six-fold for China. The EU’s enterprises 
and customers earn profits from products’ price competitiveness and consumer goods 
that damage the manufacturing industry in EU. Actually, it is not only China; in the 
developing countries in East Asia the problem exists. The EU and North America, on 
the one hand, maintain a close trade partnership with East Asia (especially 
ASEAN+3); on the other hand, they request that Asian cut duties to advance fair trade, 
open markets, supply fair competitive regulations and protect intellectual property.   
Let us now return to the international financial system, where Europe and North 
America’s economical trends still play a key role guiding the world’s economic 
development. The EU expands its power by east European enlargement, but North 
America has intensified its conservatism. Compared with North America, the EU’s 
economic growth rate of 3.8% was higher than the US’s 2.6% in 2006. The EU central 
bank argues that economic resurgence and the foundation of expansion are both based 
on obtaining greater equilibrium; at the same time, the external environment has 
become advantageous, and it is no longer necessary to rely on US exports any more. 
Facing an economic shift, the integrated announcement of East Asia breaks the pattern 
of competition between the EU and North America. In the integration of East Asia, 
political problems were viewed as interference in economic integration, religion, 
disputed territory and economic regime divisiveness, all visualized in political conflict. 
Based on world pathways, nobody forecast that the political problems would be 
constrained by economic negotiations.  
Historically, the most significant consequence of the rise of new great powers is 
international political change. As Gilpin pointed out, “a precondition for political 
change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution 
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of power to those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.”192 
Passing through the process of calculation and though the EU and North America 
confront a rising East Asia which is not immediately dangerous, however, can cause a 
realignment in the international system. How do two regions deal with the rising 
power? Facing the risk, they must set up strategies and policy-making. 
East Asia as a rising power alters the configuration of relative power in the system, 
inevitably presenting the established powers with both threats and opportunities: some 
stand to benefit by its emergence, others fear that they will be disadvantaged. World 
powers with substantial interests in the region of the rising power will be affected 
more than distant powers with minor or no interests in the area of its growth. The EU 
and North America were affected by the emergence of a new power differing not only 
in kind but also in degree. Two factors, risk propensity and revisionist aims193, largely 
account for the variety of state responses to rising powers. Furthermore, we can 
calculate the EU and North America’s response to a rising power. The EU is close to 
“engagement through strength” for Asia’s anaclisis, while North America is closer to 
containment/balancing. Nevertheless, their strategic involvement in some of these 
strategies involve alliances, while others do not; some use alliances for 
capability-aggregation purposes, others use them as tools of management; some seek 
security from the rising power, others aim to profit by it194, so that even their attempts 
are different.  
         
                                                 
192 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge university press1981) pp. 9 
193 For the purposes of analysis, these various state responses may be grouped into six basic policy options: (1) 
preventive war, (2) balancing, (3) bandwagoning, (4) binding, (5) engagement, and (6) distancing/ buck-passing. 
see Robert S Ross,., Engaging China. London; (New York: Routledge, 1999). pp. 8-22. 
194 Ibid, pp. 7. 
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3.2 Possible Pathway  
From the perspectives of geography-history, regional strategy, attempts and 
power-roles, we have understood North America and EU’s perspective concerning 
rising East Asia power and East Asian system operations. Furthermore, we can 
comprehend the process of power realignment. In the process of power realignment, it 
the analytic process can be simplified into two elements: 1.) The emerging sense of 
East Asian community may reinforce the formation of an East Asian bloc, either open 
or closed. 2.) North American and EU interest in East Asia, meaning that the U.S. and 
the EU both become exclusively inward-looking. East Asia is, like the European 
Union, an asymmetrical form of regionalism. There are significant differences in 
economic and political structure, population, levels of development and degree of 
integration into the world among East Asia members. We calculate that Northeast 
Asia is an economic and military entity, yet it needs a strong and broad ASEAN as a 
provider of club goods. With respect to the likely influence of a prospective “ASEAN 
plus 3” on either APEC or ASEM, this is one of the most interesting scenarios that 
calls for further exploration. However, dilemmas have created an impasse over 
determining priorities pertaining to economic cooperation and territorial disputes195. 
Therefore, in which form East Asia will integrate, is the first question that must be 
clarified.     
The specific outcome will be determined by the U.S. and the EU’s interest in East 
Asia as discussed below. EU and North American regional strategies cannot be 
ignored. Europe and North America simultaneously increase regional influence. The 
European Union’s relationship to Eastern Europe increases economic and technical 
                                                 
195 Saleem M. Khan and Zahira S. Khan, “ Asian Economic Integration: A Perspective on South Asia.” Journal of 
Asian Economics. vol. 13(6), 2003, pp. 767-785 
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cooperation, and is facilitated more freely today than under the communists, 
increasing a comprehensive relationship and the region’s internal economic scale. The 
European Union’s relationship with Eastern Europe concerns the new security 
situation and the links with NATO196. The new region-building initiatives in the 
Americas tries to link Latin America and the Caribbean（LAC）with economic 
liberalization and the new political agenda. We must consider whether two regional 
organizations add internal region policies which influence East Asian interregional 
cooperation.  We draw the possible pathways in Figure 6. 
( I ) If an East Asian grouping such as “ASEAN plus 3” is created that proves stable, 
the growing interconnectedness and the network nature of interstate economic 
activities may produce an increasing awareness and sense of community among East 
Asian countries197. Northeast Asian countries will become more confident in their 
ability to create their own supra-regional grouping; they might be more willing to 
extend their institutionalization efforts to the trans-regional level of APEC. Similarly, 
the increasing sense of community within East Asia could facilitate the ASEM forum, 
leading to pure Asia-Europe inter-regionalism. In path ( I ) we can say that If 
“ASEAN plus 3” is enhanced ceaselessly and both the U.S. and the EU have a high 
degree of interest in East Asia, both APEC and ASEM might be reinforced, id est  
East Asia possesses strong operational power and ascribed power and role be 
characterized attraction. EU and North American will increase its operational role to 
cooperate with East Asia.    
 
                                                 
196 Gamble, Andrew, Regionalism and World Order. (Macmillan. 1996) pp. 78-85 
197 Terada, T “Constructing an "East Asia" Concept and Growing Regional Identity: From EAEC to ASEAN+3”, 
Pacific Review, vol.16 (2) 2003. pp. 251-77. 
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（II）+（III） 
In present circumstances, APEC (esp. North American) has influenced real economic 
conditions and the U.S. has commanded military security rather than ASEM. ASEM 
as a principle institution between Europe and East Asia might restrain execution of 
agreements. Facing the ASEM threat, North America will be strengthened by 
increasingly complex supra-regional relationships and a deep and broad scope of 
activities across through East Asia within APEC.          
By contrast, APEC is weak and ASEM is strong. The logic behind this prediction is 
that East Asia may choose to either balance American unilateralism with the EU or to 
bandwagon with U.S. supremacy based on capabilities and their perceptions of threats. 
If East Asia felt a strong antipathy towards North America, and attempted to enhance 
a partnership, European and Asian “equals” would finally materialize as the 
“counterpart coherence” is made comparably equal on the East Asian side198. In those 
two paths, East Asia’s operational power is enough strong to make their cooperation 
parter, or, either North American or EU operational power stronger than another draw 
East Asia in its side.     
( IV ) +（V） 
Although East Asia has become more confident in its ability, Europe and North 
America have individual regional organizations. The EU enlarges with East Europe 
and North America widens from NAFTA to FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) 
who might re- enlarge regional policy to respective regions. Both APEC and ASEM 
will be undermined. Its outcome will possibly lead to the Fortress mentality. Other 
                                                 
198 VK Aggarwal, MG Koo, “The Evolution of APEC and ASEM: Implications of the New East Asian 
Bilateralism.” European Journal of East Asian Studies. vol. 4 (2). 2005. pp. 262. 
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paths will lead to the same outcome if the East Asian Community has a sense of 
marginalization. If the U.S. continues its focus on the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) and the EU continues on an eastward and possibly southward 
expansion path, others may feel excluded199, leading to a “Fortress Europe” and 
“Fortress America.” The strategic relationship of East Asia could strengthen internal 
relationships and build “Fortress Asia” for competition with the rest of world.  
（VI）+（VII） 
In economic terms, if there is no East Asian Community, Northeast Asia cannot 
integrate with ASEAN in the minimum and is likely to have strong incentives to 
secure club goods through bilateral arrangements. World cooperation must depend on 
economic complementation from individual negotiations under the WTO. If economic 
complementation is strong, it enhances the institutional strength of the WTO. By 
contrast, if an individual negotiation has weak economic complementation, it might 
lead to a weak WTO. In politics, if there is no East Asian Community, North 
America’s own support would come from most East Asian countries, but there are 
some power-politic countries in Northeast Asia (especially China) who will 
experience a parallel situation. Whether the EU can soundlessly face North American 
predominance in East Asia, is problematic. ASEM has intervened in the Korean 
Peninsula and East Timor; and APEC has fit security issues into the regime. However, 
if East Asia cannot integrate into an entity, all issues must remain under the UN. 
Political issues, like economic issues, need deeper trust; otherwise, it would corrode 
the institutions in the international order.   
                                                 
199 Ibid, pp. 261.  
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Figure 6: Possible Paths of Supra-Regionalism 
 
Sense of (Open) East 
Asian Community 
Both or either
one of APEC 
and ASEM 
enhanced(Ⅰ)
Strong APEC 
Weak ASEM 
（Ⅱ） 
US and EU interest in East Asia 
Weak 
APEC 
Strong 
ASEM（Ⅲ）
Both APEC 
and 
ASEM weak
（Ⅳ） 
Sense of Marginalization 
East Asian Community 
Fortress 
Asia （Ⅴ）
Strong and broad 
bilateral (benign) 
WTO,UN enhanced
（Ⅵ） 
Strong and narrow 
bilateral 
(Pernicious) 
WTO,UN 
undermined（Ⅶ）
No East Asian community 
Source: change from VK Aggarwal, MG Koo, “The Evolution of APEC and ASEM: Implications of the New East Asian Bilateralism.” 
European Journal of East Asian Studies. vol. 4 (2). 2005. pp. 259, 233-262(30) 
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4. Conclusion 
Continuing chapter 3 and chapter 4 analysis, in this chapter, we analyze power 
realignment. We determine the possible pathways of power realignment by the 
concrete relations of geography-history and co-governance. Economic cooperation is 
the start of political interaction. A broader look at history suggests that the same 
Asian goals for an economic and political system existed long before colonial 
repression 200 . Existing power and rising power interknit complex international 
relations. East Asia's emergence and integration have affected the world order change, 
Europe and the America have their own regional organization, respectively, but the 
international society is the related company; it is not necessary to remain independent 
to uphold their superiority in international society. Each power realignment factor will 
create continuous change. Each individual is like a junction, is connecting the 
individuals, which mutually affects the constitution of international society, and the 
construction of the international society movement order. East Asia’s emergence also 
is like this; East Asia has its unique geography, culture and the historical development. 
North America always sees East Asia as an important exterior region; however, 
Europe once left East Asia after World War II’s revival. The globalization 
developments, the European and American regional establishment, give East Asia the 
chance for a world role attempt; such attempt also increased North America and 
Europe to cooperate with East Asia. Not only is this attempt part of the region’s 
interior common interest, but also the international order’s hope for stability. 
The attempt has brought the possibility of co-governance. Three regions, two 
supra-regional organizations different mechanisms and the rules, showed 
                                                 
200 Frank, Andre Gunder. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1998). 
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co-governance without government, at the same time that cooperation and 
competition were occurring. Its power structure may be divided into the material 
structure and the cognitive structure. The material structure, because of slow system 
change, was often considered one kind of static process; it explained the government 
processes’ concrete condition. Three regions’ co-governance showed that the system 
has a superior existence. East Asia took the variable of power realignment that 
changed past states of equilibrium, and emerged seeking the new balance process. 
Three regions in the globalization development, and its inter-regional organization all 
unfold multi-dimensionally, unceasing dialogue and communications. 
However, the material structure still needed the cognitive structure to give significant 
support, explaining the actors’ ideas which transformed to the system. Regional 
integration and supra-regional governance allow respective regions to establish their 
own culture and the special characteristic foreign behavior. It is similar to East Asia, 
in the process which emerges, unceasing adjustments as the characteristic which has 
to fuse capitalism and the international order. In addition, establishment and 
intercommunication of citizen culture, also gave the government cooperation another 
pipeline, in cushion politics and the economic frontage conflict. From East Asia's 
historical and geographic characteristics, East Asia is at variance with the 
characteristics of Western culture. Analyzing the three regions regarding the 
cooperation characteristic, the European Union rules the system; North America takes 
the leading position and the benefit, while East Asia emphasizes independence, 
looking for a suitable “Asia-ness”. But one may realize, with a succession of regional 
conformity and in the inter-regional system process, that East Asia belongs to its own 
citizen culture (as with the European Union and North America). As Samuel 
Huntington said it might become the civilized conflict, also as Rosenau to think is one 
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kind of news transmission the difference easy to make the cushion for the 
government.  
From the above power structure, we may extend the authority and role analysis; this 
analysis makes us to understand regional cooperation, and the difference which it 
produces. The balance in international relations, seem a supply and demand condition, 
unceasingly seeking the possibility of balance. In a stable international system, 
role-power misalignment would not exist, so all states would possess a role-power 
misalignment factor of zero. East Asia when emerging, because of potential power 
search and the reorientation of role, can panic existing powers; seeking to balance the 
process, may provide East Asia and the existing power with two aspects to seek the 
pathway of power realignment.  
Which way is most possible? The East Asian region integration process is one kind 
necessary tendency, but for internal political subjects involving economics, the 
economic subject pulls is lifting the political subject, like the “spaghetti bowl”, 
although so far it has not led to a serious conflict, but time is needed for forgiveness. 
Externally, the European Union and North America have respective hopes, the region 
is unable to resist the strength of globalization, because the international politics’ 
mutual effects, but the European Union and North America still could strengthen their 
own region organization ability. Region organization in international society is 
overlapping and nested. An international politically organization, the UN and 
economic organization, the WTO, was still the global behavior body competition field 
territory under such rules, causing diverse possible pathways for the power 
realignment.  
No matter what kind of way is taken, we all believe in the international relations 
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conflict viewpoint; actors in favor of a peaceful resolution often, in setting up regimes, 
or official and informal communication, are the main means. East Asia and its 
partners are widely seeking an overarching goal; actors can use the legal and 
normative framework of the cooperation to substantiate their claims and de-legitimize 
previously dominant positions. If used by governments, this path relies on what is 
otherwise seen as a problematic feature of actors’ governance, its tangled interest, in 
that political leaders use the cooperation framework to push through policies in 
peaceful negotiations. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
1. Power Realignment of International Competition 
1.1 Power Realignment is a System Analysis 
A system is established by some interacting units201.A useful theory must deal with 
both systems and units in same way, so the question is how best to proceed.202 
However, a useful theory also needs a hypothesis to circumscribe its field. Power 
realignment is similar to simple analysis but actually involves a series of dynamic 
transformations, affected by the internal capability and cognition of external actors. 
The adjustment of the power constrains itself from historical reversibility. On the one 
hand, the current stakeholder does not want its power or interest to be threatened or 
weakened, and the followers do not want to be changed, either.  
The events that will direct the future are not always attainable via the hegemony 
method. The unpredictability of transformation concludes in the inertia of history. 
That is the reversibility in power adjustment. What we can do instead, is to make 
predictions and suggest what information and conditions could be followed. In order 
to estimate the power realignment, we have to limit the system we discussed, and set 
up the number of actors we researched, as well as the critical key elements. We can 
understand the changing conditions by probing into the changes of an individual actor. 
By probing into all the actors, we can understand the changes in the system. The 
inaccuracy of estimation comes from the simplification of element configuration and 
the unpredictability of an individual actor. 
                                                 
201 N. Waltz Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics, (McGraw-Hill Higher Education), pp. 40. 
202 M Brecher. 1999. “International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond” International Studies Quarterly, 
vol.43, no.2, pp. 213-263. 
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1.2 Power Realignment is for Seeking Potentiality  
A useful theory must provide recommendation for future. The study of international 
realignment has to stress reification and empiricism: the study of power is its 
represent motive of self-interest, and to achieve the maximum satisfaction. Events 
such as the occurrence of competition and cooperation represent the actors’ intentions. 
The study of events surpasses in value those on language. It does not, however, deny 
the value of nominalism. Actors’ language represents what it wants and what caused 
its role. Positive behaviors reveal capability (or power). The critique of positivism 
purports that the social world can be shown to be a composite of a number of 
behavioral regularities which could eventually be described by social law akin to that 
of natural science 203 . Knowledge is identifiable only by reliable empiricism.  
Essentially comparing East Asian development to international interaction tends 
towards realism and positivism. 
The rising of East Asia and convergence of foreign policies are the result of a series of 
historical processes, each event point changing East Asia, with existing powers 
causing the international order to change gradually through inter-communications and 
interactions. East Asia participates in the operation of existing powers and is causing 
international power realignment as can be recognized by D. Easton’s systematic 
analysis204. For political phenomenon, it adopts an approach of integration that 
                                                 
203Sayer R. Andrew, Realism and Social Science. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000). 
204 Actor changes its policy for external pressure. The output of policy and action will become a input after the 
influence in environment through feedback. The rising East Asia is a element moves EU and North America to 
correct Asia’s policy, which is a output but a inducement to demand East Asia integation or corss-regional 
cooperation. 
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emphasizes that society tends toward order and integration. Actors grope after 
stability and convergence. Learning, for actors, is an important process of cognition in 
moving toward co-ordination and consensus.  
2. Equilibrium in the 21st Century East Asia 
“Power realignment” tried to explain rising power seeks possible ways to jump into 
international arena when system changes. Rising power brings a new order through 
intrinsic characteristic, at the same time international system feedback continual 
adjustment by existing power. East Asia is the region with the greatest movement on 
the power realignment. From power change within the process of authoritative 
reorganization, we may discover several characteristics in East Asia.  
1.  Contradiction between pluralism and the hegemony in the process of realignment. 
The international society of emerging East Asia does not resemble the 
international environment when Europe emerged. The different developed 
elements were considered is needs to manage. In the interior, up to now the 
colonized consciousness in East Asia still could not be completely separated from 
the economy and the military protection of North American. North America wants 
the leading position which it already has, Europe to start to actually win East 
Asia's cooperation; such behavior lets East Asia establish its own political region. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Fig. 7: Environment-Input-Output-Feedback-Modell
David Easton. A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, 1965. pp. 32. 
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In the exterior, the global system has an assimilative function, although the 
interior has the difference. East Asia positive seeks one in the different western 
culture to advance regional interest by orient foreign behavior.  
2. The process of power realignment in East Asian, no longer relies on past 
confederative relations of power balance. Two supra-regional organizations, also 
all has the mutual diversion function. Regarding complex vertical and horizontal 
relations, actually all members in the international society desire international 
order stability.  
3. The pathway of realignment may have different situations occur according to 
different possibilities. East Asia integration is a necessary tendency but within still 
has many variables. In East Asia, there are evolutional gap, diverse culture and 
political disputes that all affect the speed and model of integration. Furthermore, 
North America and EU have constantly regional enlargement that will influence 
the Asian cooperated policy, e.g., investment and technologic training. However, 
only if East Asia capabilities begin to converge with East Asian international role 
will regulative order in this tri-lateral relationship likely cease. 
3. Critique and Additional Research Question 
3.1 Critique  
The variable deviation is difficult to control. In the process of power realignment, the 
independent variable is the gravity of research center, but by no means are other 
variables in the realistic society are fixed invariables, but for avoiding studying 
intricately, we simplify many indefinite elements. Furthermore, we all understand the 
power realignment overweight possibility from foreign policy and statements. 
“Discordant messages” and “discontinuity of expectations” at critical points, together 
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with a sense of threat and perceived injustice regarding state demands provoke major 
change in the movement. This can affect our judgment of realignment; therefore, we 
only can make the plans for possible pathways. 
3.2 Additional Research Question 
This article mainly makes a preliminary concept plan for a process of power 
realignment; this concept need more cases for evidence and revision. Discussions of 
power realignment may be from vertical and horizontal dimensions, but mainly 
concerns the main actors in the spatial definition transformation. The power 
realignment originally was the discussion power change in the system; it has a certain 
spatial scope hypothesis. Furthermore, the realignment emphasizes balance-seeking 
that also provides policy-makers guidelines to analyze alternate policies. We 
acknowledge that the balance is dynamic, instability is normal in international society, 
although in international politics systemic change, people always argued that it is 
static because the change is slow. In this paper, the hypothesis is that system is 
dynamic and offers actors multiform opportunities and challenges. Nevertheless, the 
external policy has to consider inherent ideology (culture). This provides a research 
question that is studying in onefold issue. The power realignment proceeds from the 
historical culture to understand differences between actors’ foreign policy behavior, 
which is alliance or isolation. However, it needs more case studies to prove or correct 
process of power realignment. Hence, power realignment is a conception in not only 
international level, but also a peculiar subject when analyzing the redistribution of 
energy, the economical or the military power. 
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